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EDITORIAL

One of the most interesting phenomena of Post-Independence India is that whereas there has been an encouraging revival and growth of Indian languages and literatures, English studies in India also seem to have acquired a new dimension of contemporary relevance. The study of English language and literature, particularly at the post-graduate level, has never been more universally popular than today. There has been an unprecedented interest in advanced literary research in English, American, and if one may add, Indo-Anglian literatures. Editors of various foreign journals, devoted to research in medieval, modern and contemporary periods, have begun to respond warmly to contributions from Indian scholars, presumably because of the possibilities in many cases of an Indian approach to western literary problems.

Osmania University, which has already pioneered many an academic cause in the past, has now undertaken to offer opportunities of publication to critical talent in India. Although the first issue of *Osmania Journal of English Studies* carries articles and reviews from Osmanians only, it is hoped that in due course of time, it will be possible for us to invite contributions from other universities as well.

We should here like to thank Dr. D. S. Reddi, Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University, for his generous encouragement and help in enabling us to launch this journal.

S. K. K.
V. A. S.

'PROGRESS' IN LANGUAGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO LITERARY EXPRESSION

BY

V. K. GOKAK

'PROGRESS' in language is a concept bound up with the idea of human progress in its widest significance. It is doubtful whether linguistic changes of one kind or another can be interpreted to indicate 'progress' in the evolution of a language. When we interpret certain changes as marks of 'progress' we tend to look at these phenomena from a utilitarian angle,—from the standpoint of their usefulness and applicability in one sphere or another.

Let us now consider the larger significance of the concept of 'Progress.' Man has changed considerably in his responses and reactions to Nature through the centuries. He has changed from savagery to civilization. It is generally conceded today that this represents an advance, a progressive step, in the life of humanity. But voices are not wanting that bewail the decadence that has gripped the very heart of modern civilization.

One may encounter a similar opposition to the idea of 'Progress' in language. Some linguists believe that, speaking from the standpoint of modern civilization, a language like English has gained considerably in what Jespersen calls 'a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of effort,' in changing over from the synthetic to the analytical family of languages. But it has also lost heavily on the side of music and of harmony between sound and meaning. It is true that languages have grown more 'efficient,' but it is only the efficiency of the Machine Age. In fact they are losing their soulfulness and shapeliness.

The view that flexional languages are to be regarded as superior because of the high state of their morphological richness has now been discredited. "We find that many savage tribes, with a degree of culture decidedly inferior to ours, speak languages of the most intricate polysynthetic and incorporating type."[1] If flexional languages have a neatness and grace of their own, their wealth of morphological

(1) W. L. Graff, *Language and Languages* (New York, 1932), p. 159.

forms is supposed to be rather cumbrous from the anthropocentric point of view. Jespersen maintains that that language is the most developed which gives " a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of effort." From this point of view, it will have to be admitted that the levelling down of inflections, the disappearance of verbal concord, of the old case system and of grammatical gender, and the suppleness of analysis as contrasted with the rigidity of synthesis, constitute a tangible advance from " a more to a less intricate system."

It should, however, be interesting to observe how Vendryes argues against any real advance from a more to a less intricate system in morphology. He holds that the three stages—isolated, agglutinative and inflectional—are the result of modifications, taking place in every language simultaneously. In a highly advanced language with a long past, like English or French, different types representing the three different ' stages ' are to be found combined in the general system. The monosyllabism of English, for instance, is often only too apparent. English has borrowed French and Latin polysyllables on a large scale. The difference between languages is said to consist in the position occupied by the morphemes and in the nature of the link uniting morphemes and words. But, as Vendryes says, this is only an incidental, and not a fundamental difference. One cannot deduce from this any convenient principle for classifying languages. Still less does it furnish any criteria of appraising ' progress ' in language.

Vendryes also states that linguistic acquisitions are always ephemeral and are invariably counterbalanced by losses. " The same language, at two different periods of its history, doubtless presents two very different aspects; the elements of which it is built up are changed, displaced or reversed. But as a whole the total gain and total loss very nearly balance each other. The different aspects of morphological evolution remind one of the changing images seen in a kaleidoscope which one may go on producing indefinitely, changing the combination but never the sum of the elements of which the combinations are composed."[2]

Shall we then say that, aesthetically speaking, one type of morphological structure is as good as another? The changes brought about in Modern English have been claimed

(2) *Language: Linguistic Introduction to History*, translated by P. Radin (New York, 1925), p. 352.

to represent an advance over the older stages of the language from the point of view of " a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of effort." But aesthetically speaking, have these changes made English less expressive or more expressive, less beautiful or more beautiful?

Modern English has developed what Bradley calls a " noiseless grammatical machinery." All inflectional distinctions in the definite article have been eliminated. The only inflections surviving in the adjective are the comparative and the superlative. The inflections in the noun have been reduced to the -s of the plural and of the genitive. There is the loss of practically all the personal endings in the verb and nearly of all distinctions between the singular and plural. The old simple form of the subjunctive has been replaced by the newer form with a modal auxiliary. Most of these revolutionary changes in grammar took place during the Middle English period. It is only the vocabulary that has changed extensively during the modern period. Elizabethan English strikes us as different from present-day English only in respect of certain minor differences of form, syntax and idiom, not in any fundamental developments.

The dropping of all gender distinctions is a development that has made for greater ease of expression in the language. But Jespersen points out that the English language is defective in this respect, since it has not so far evolved a common-sex pronoun, referring to either *he* or *she*.[3] The loss of inflectional endings and forms is a process still operating in the language. Present-day English reveals a tendency to level the inflected forms of *who* by using *who* in place of *whom*. Since the idea of personality has come to be emphasised more in Modern English, it has led to the establishment of a distinction in the use of *who* and *which*, both of which came into use as relative pronouns in Late Middle English. They were used without any palpable differentiation in Early Modern English. *Whose* is used both for persons and things even now, but *who* only of persons whereas *which* is used of animals and it indicates generally the absence of personality.

This loss has resulted in several new developments in the language. The place of the inflectional endings has now been taken by such inflectional prepositions as *to*, *from*, *about*,

(3) O. Jespersen, *Language, its Nature, Development and Origin* (London, 1930), p. 347.

etc. The position of the noun with regard to the verb or the preposition also makes the grammatical position clear. Sometimes the context alone helps us to determine the case, as in this sentence: "This woman is making her little son a new coat," where, as Curme and Kurath point out, "the dative is recognized by its position before the accusative."[4]

With the loss of the old case endings and the increased use of prepositions and the regular word order, new prepositions have been and are being formed for convenience of expression. They are formed from adverbs as in *beside* and *alongside of*, from nouns as in *instead of* and *on account of*, and from present participles as in *regarding*, *touching*, etc. Even a perfect participle is sometimes used for this purpose as in *past* and *as compared with*. New conjunctions like *supposing*, *provided*, *grant that*, *directly*, etc., have also come into existence. As pointed out already, this is an adjustment in favour of convenience of expression, rather than beauty in any particular sense.

Verb-adverb combinations of the type *set out*, *put off*, *bring in*, etc., are an outstanding feature of modern vocabulary. They show the increased flexibility of the language.

The disappearance of the old case distinctions has also given rise to several idioms which would have been impossible in the older synthetic stage of the language. A construction like "I love, and am loved by, my wife" is possible because the word *wife* does not take case-endings in Modern English.

The loss of inflection in the adjective in Middle English is said to have been partly responsible for the rise of *one* as a fourth person and as a 'prop-word,' or the anaphoric *one* and the independent *one*. Jespersen says that it came into use during the sixteenth century as a prop-word and during the fifteenth century as the 'evasive I' or 'modified they.' He also refers to further developments in this field during the nineteenth century: *the ones*, *this one*, *what one* and the use of *one* after a possessive pronoun as in "when a woman is old ... But *my one*! she is not old."

There is a tendency to prefer the indicative to the subjunctive in certain categories in present-day English. This, according to Curme, indicates a change in our way

(4) G. Curme and Kurath, *A Grammar of the English Language* (New York, 1931), Vol. II, p. 132.

of thinking. Today we decidedly prefer to look at many things, not as mere conceptions, but as things near to us, as actual problems with which we must deal.[5] Thus we generally say " I shall not go, if it *rains*," and not " I shall not go, if it *rain*." But this does not mean that the subjunctive is gradually falling out of use. We continue to deal with conceptions of many kinds as before. As the simple subjunctive forms lost their endings, modal auxiliaries like *can*, *will*, *may*, *might*, etc., were employed for expressing the same ideas.

There have also been independent developments in English which are significant in many respects. These were not due to an effort on the part of the language to make up for any loss. They are only new features developed in the course of linguistic changes. Thus the group genitive was developed during the Elizabethan period. Expressions like *King of England, Duke of Gloucester*, etc., occurred frequently as units, and the group genitive arose during the fifteenth century. It became very common during the sixteenth century, and today it is an integral part of the language, and expressions like *the chief actor in the play's illness* are looked upon as perfectly normal.

English has also what Jespersen calls " the freedom of expressing grammatically a unity consisting of several parts."[6] He cites several examples to illustrate the point : " I do not think I ever spent a more delightful three weeks " (Charles Darwin) and " Three Years is but short " (Shakespeare). He shows that adverbs and prepositional complexes may be used attributively as in " an almost reconciliation " (Thackeray) and " smoking his before-breakfast pipe " (Conan Doyle). Even whole sentences are used adjectively as in Lowell's " *With an I-turn-the-crank-of-the-universe air.* "

There is also the construction of the appositive genitive referred to by Curme and Kurath.[7] It indicates the class to which a thing or object belongs: *a jewel of a cup, a frail slip of a woman*, etc. This usage does not occur in Old English. It is said to have been borrowed from French but it may be traced back to the Latin appositive genitive. It is an acquisi-

(5) G. Curme and Kurath, *A Grammar of the English Language* (New York 1931), Vol. III, (Syntax), p. 390.

(6) Jespersen, Otto, *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 189.

(7) Curme and Kurath, Volume III, p. 85.

tion which certainly adds to the picturesqueness of the language. Curme and Kurath state that, in the field of the verb, the infinite forms are now used more extensively than before. This is because of their 'handiness' and 'elegant simplicity.'[8] It is true that their use is restricted only to subordinate clauses. Several new passive forms have also come into use during the modern period: the *Get*-passive ('I suppose it will get whispered about'), the *Become*-passive ('He became seized with a profound melancholy') and the *Come-to* passive ('He has come to be treated more kindly').

Another feature of present-day English is the use of the transitive verb without an object, *i.e.*, absolutely. The following examples, which are taken from Curme and Kurath, illustrate the point. Such a use is occasioned by the fact that, at the moment, we are thinking only of the action and not of a person or thing as connected with the action: "He likes to *give*," "The hens are *laying*." This tendency has been operating in English for many centuries. There are other intransitives made from transitives as in 'she *dresses* plainly.' The reflexive pronoun is used only when we think of a person or thing as 'acting on himself or itself.' Thus we say 'he *felt* disgusted' but 'he *felt himself* degraded.' Many of these new intransitives acquire passive force as in 'My hat *blew* (or *has blown*) into the river.' 'Such houses *sell* (or *can be sold*) easily.' Transitive verbs have also been 'developed out of intransitives.' In Old English *baernan* meant 'to make something burn' and *beornan* "to burn;" *dren an* meant to 'cause to drink; drench;' and *drincan* meant 'drink.' But the same forms are now put both to transitive and intransitive use in many cases: "I *burned* up the rubbish" and also "The rubbish *burned* up;" "The pilot *flew* me to Suez" and "She (airship) *flew* to Paris." The causative idea is generally expressed by using the auxiliaries *make*, *have* or *let*. It is therefore evident that the language has gained in vigour as well as beauty through such expressions.

English had only two tenses to start with,—the present and the past, but now there are six tenses in use—the present, the past, the present perfect, the past perfect, the future and the future perfect. The present perfect tense was evolved in Early Old English, and it was during the Middle English

(8) *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 205.

period that the compound tenses were mostly developed with *have, be, will, shall, may, might, mun* (' will; ' from O.N. *munu*), *can* and *gan.*

Expressions like *he waes laerende* (he was teaching) are found in Old English, but these forms are rare in Middle English. They were developed mainly during the Early Modern Period, and are now used in all tenses: (*is laughing*; *was laughing*; *will be laughing*). The progressive passive came into general use in the early years of the nineteenth century.[9] An expression like *the house is building*, descended from the older form *the house is on building*, and this could often be construed as either active or passive. This was later replaced by the progressive passive,—*the house is being built* and the emphatic do-forms were also developed by about the middle of the eighteenth century.

" A notable feature of the history of the English language," says Jespersen " is the building up of a rich system of *tenses* on the basis of the few possessed by Old English."[10] The periphrastic tenses *I am reading, I was reading, I have been reading, I shall be reading* are of a recent growth and they were not " fully developed even in Shakespeare's time."

A closer scrutiny of these changes is likely to reveal the fact that the English language has lost considerably in aesthetic expressiveness because of them. With the inflectional endings has also disappeared their musical expressiveness. The poetry of the old simple subjunctive tends to disappear from the language, unless it is used for its archaic charm.

Another loss is that of the ring and emphasis of strong verbs, which are gradually decaying. It has been computed that there are now less than one hundred strong verbs in the language.[11] New verbs formed from nouns and adjectives and foreign verbs are being assimilated in the weak class. Only a few weak verbs like *chide, wear* and *dig* have deviated from their traditional pattern.

The change-over to the weak inflection was a marked tendency of the language even during the Middle English

(9) Curme and Kurath, *A Grammar of the English Language*, Vol. II, p. 221.

(10) Jespersen, O, *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, p. 189.

(11) Curme and Kurath, *A Grammar of the English Language*, Vol. II, p. 304.

period. This may have resulted to some extent in the loss of melodic variety, but the language has certainly gained in uniformity. *Snow–snew–snown* is, musically, more pleasant than *snow–snowed–snowed.* But the genius of the language is apparently making the field of the verb in its strong-weak aspect a ground for experiments in uniformity and ease of expression. In this context Curme and Kurath observe: "The most marked feature in the growth of modern English forms is the amazing activity in the field of the verb. Not only entirely new structures have been reared but new life has been injected into older creations that were living but feebly. In the modern period the English people has shown its love of activity not only by establishing empires all over the world but also by creating new forms of the verb so that it can talk about the things that it is conceiving and doing. And the marvel of it all is the simplicity of these new forms of expression."[12]

The gradual disappearance of inflectional endings of the old simple subjunctive and the class of strong verbs has, no doubt, affected adversely the melodic capacity of the English language. But it can hardly be doubted that the new prepositions, verb-adverb combinations, the rise of 'one' as a fourth person, the group genitive, the attributive use of adverbs and prepositional complexes, the adjectival use of whole sentences, the appositive genitive, the extensive use of the infinite forms of verbs, the new passive forms, the absolute use of transitive verbs, and the rich system of tenses built up during the Early Modern Period, have all increased considerably the expressive power of the language.

The change in the language from a synthetic to an analytic structure has resulted in an increased rigidity of word-order. Because of the inflectional simplicity of Modern English, a regular word-order alone can rescue the language from ambiguity of expression. The inversions that we get in poetry, (like Gray's "And all the air a solemn stillness holds," where we cannot tell whether it is the air that holds the stillness or the stillness that holds the air), frequently obscure the meanings that the poet seeks to convey. Expressions like 'The house beautiful,' 'Captains courageous' and 'The human face divine' are exceptional and are meant to be taken as such. The normal word-order of Subject-Verb-Object is inverted only when there is some special reason

(12) Curme and Kurath, *A Grammar of the English Language*, p. VI.

for it. Jespersen, who holds that ' the substitution of word-order for flexions means a victory of spiritual over material agencies,' remarks that the change came about partly because of the loss of flexional endings by phonetic decay and partly as a ' natural consequence of greater mental development and general maturity.' To the objection that a free order of words would be desirable in the interests of poetic communication: he replies " We cannot all of us be poets.....secondly, a statistical investigation would, no doubt, give as its result that those poets who make the most extensive use of inversions are not among the greatest of their craft; and, finally so many methods are found of neutralising the restraint of word-order, in the shape of particles, passive voice, different constructions of sentences, etc., that no artist in language need despair."

Present-day poets favour suppression of clauses or propositions rather than inversions. In Browning's " Oh to be in England now that April's there !", the principal proposition: " Oh, how happy I should be, " etc., is suppressed. The poetry of Masefield, T. S. Eliot, Louis MacNeice and other contemporaries shows that it is possible to write with feeling and taste without necessarily inverting the word-order. An analytic language has its own advantages as the vehicle of poetry, and I don't think it can be maintained that a language suits poetry better simply because it is synthetic or analytic. Chaucer secures a fine poetic effect by placing the verb first:

" *Ran* Colle our dogge, and Talbot, and Gerland,

* * * *

Ran cow and calf, and eek the verray hogges.'

(*The Nonnes Preestes Tale*, l. 563).

Jack London produces a similar effect in *The Sea-Wolf* (Ch. XXVII: ' *Came* days of storm, days and nights of storm, when the ocean menaced us with its roaring whiteness, and the wind smote our struggling boat with a Titan's buffets.') But there is an equally commendable effect obtained in the following passage by an omission of verbs, by the use of verbs in their regular position, and by placing the verbs first as is legitimately done in imperative sentences:

" Children's voices in the orchard
Between the blossom—and the fruit-time:

Golden head, crimson head,
Between the green tip and the root.
Black wing, brown wing, hover over;
Twenty years and the spring is over;
Today grieves, tomorrow grieves,
Cover me over, light-in-leaves;
Golden head, black wing,
Cling, swing,
Spring, sing,
Swing up into the apple-tree."

T. S. Eliot: *Landscapes*

Masefield's *Cargoes* achieves a similar effect without any inversions, by just leaving out the principal proposition:

" Quinquireme of Nineveh from distant Ophir
Rowing home to haven in sunny Palestine,
With a cargo of ivory,
And apes and peacocks,
Sandalwood, cedarwood, and sweet white wine."

In his *Bagpipe Music*, Louis MacNeice creates a pleasing musical pattern by suppressing the conjunction or the usual repetition of the subject or the pronoun standing for it, and using at the beginning of lines principal verbs like, ' waited, ' ' sold, ' and ' kept.'

" John MacDonald found a corpse, put it under the sofa,
Waited till it came to life and hit it with a poker,
Sold its eyes for souvenirs, sold its blood for whiskey,
Kept its bones for dumb-bells to use when he was fifty."

T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* opens in a magnificent manner, employing verbal forms strikingly at the end of lines, even as MacNeice uses verbs at the beginning, and evoking subtle music from them:—

April is the cruellest month, *breeding*
Lilacs out of the dead land, *mixing*
Memory and desire, *stirring*
Dull roots with spring rain.
Winter kept us warm, *covering*
Earth in forgetful snow, *feeding*
A little life with dried tubers "...

The analytic structure, with its uninflected bareness, would seem to be as much suited to poetry as the synthetic type with all its morphological richness.

(*To be continued*)

HOPKINS AND T. S. ELIOT—A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC INNOVATION

BY

B. N. JOSHI

" O, let us at least use the language of men ! "

—EURIPIDES, IN ARISTOPHANES' *Frogs*, 1.1057.

THE problem of poetic diction assumed a new significance in the first quarter of this century. Many poets reasserted the aesthetic validity of " the language of men." But after reading " The Wreck of the Deutschland " or " The Waste Land," we are forced to repeat with Hopkins that " We do not speak that way."[1] Euripides, Wordsworth, Hopkins, and Eliot belong to that group of revolutionary poets who rebelled against the stylized diction of their times to create a new convention that was later to grow as rigid as the one they had opposed.

Poetry after all is the very " body and pressure " of the individual and collective life at a given moment. Hence it can never be the same at any other moment, in spite of the fact that poetry as art has to function within the framework of the artistic conventions handed down by the past. A poet, observes I. A. Richards, " is the point at which the growth of the mind shows itself."[2] F. R. Leavis makes the idea still clearer by saying that the poet " is, as it were, at the most conscious point of the race of his time."[3]

When Hopkins began to write, the language of poetry had ceased to be " the language of men." It had put on official robes and become a medium of sophisticated thought and emotion. It had lost its contact with the inner stream of life beneath the flux of conscious hours. According to Eliot, " The artist is more *primitive*, as well as more civilized, than his contemporaries, his experience is deeper than civilization, and he only uses the phenomena of civilization in

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(1) *The Letters of Gerard Manly Hopkins to Robert Bridges*, Vol. I, ed. Claude Abbott (London, 1935), Letter 218.

(2) I. A. Richards, *The Principles of Criticism* (London, 1925), p. 61

(3) F. R. Leavis, *New Bearings in English Poetry* (London, 1938), p. 13.

expressing it."[4] That true poetry is an authentic voice of experience expressing all that man is and has been is a fact which must be taken into account while discussing the nature of the poetic language.

Hopkins found that the poetic language of his day had ceased to express the sense of the age. A similar awareness inspired Eliot to seek a new language that would be a genuine articulation of his actual experience. But in spite of the revolution that both these poets brought about, their linguistic innovations have outlived their directness.

Hopkins' diction emerges from his concept of poetry. To him, poetry means the 'inscape' of things. In his letter to Patmore, he says: "Poetry must have, down to its least separate part, an individualising touch."[5] This individuation, as distinct from the generic, constitutes for Hopkins the fundamental aim and function of poetry. Consequently the language of Hopkins reveals the inscape of things, the individual quality that distinguishes each phenomenon from the rest.

As a poet Eliot is primarily concerned with relating the word to the stream of life that lies beneath. "The auditory imagination" of which he speaks attempts to get "as much as possible of the whole weight of the history of the language behind his word."[6] Eliot sees in the poetic language a means of liberation, an attempt to explore the historic consciousness of man.

Both Hopkins and Eliot rebelled against the Victorian poetic diction which to them had not the power to express the genuine awareness of the poet. But whereas to Hopkins the individual quality is the only determining criterion of a true aesthetic experience, to Eliot, on the other hand, the quality that lies beneath the consciousness and unfolds the unity of the past, present, and future alone constitutes a mark of authenticity. As a result the languages of both these innovators present different linguistic problems.

But in spite of this fundamental difference the language of Hopkins and Eliot appears to be similar in certain respects.

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(4) T. S. Eliot, *The Egoist*, London, September 1918.

(5) *The Letters of Gerard Manly Hopkins to Robert Bridges*, Vol. III, Letter 155.

(6) T. S. Eliot, *The Tyro, No.* 3 (London, 1922).

Impelled by an innate desire to express the genuine experience both speak in a language that creates its own laws. In Hopkins, the logical structure, or the affective expression, or the entirely self-expressive non-grammatical language, springs into life when called forth by an intense experience. Both these poets have altered our attitude to the meaning of language and made us aware that it is not the word and its logical meaning that matters in life, but the underlying experience that invests each word with a new significance.

This leads both Hopkins and Eliot to stress the feeling behind the word, sometimes by merely listening to it. This explains why Hopkins always wanted his poetry to be read and heard. While writing to Bridges of *Euridice*, he wrote: " take breath and read it with the ears, as I always wish to be read, and my verse becomes all right."[7]

Eliot also insists on the hearing of the word. He writes: " Poetry can communicate before it is understood." The word to both is an incantation, stirring the profounder depths of man, and rousing him from his sterile absorption into a new awareness.

But in Hopkins the word awakens a sense of the individuating quality. The mind gets a sudden grasp of the distinct individuality of each experience. Hopkins writes:—

> " Each mortal thing does one thing and the same :
> Deals out that being indoors each one dwells ;
> Selves—goes itself."[8]

It is this individuating self, this *quidditas*, which the word brings into focus, enabling the reader to realize each object as an " otherness." In T. S. Eliot, however, the word stirs hidden depths, and joins the past with the present, bringing into an organic synthesis the eternal streams of human thought and emotion.

The following lines from Hopkins' " The Windhover " will illustrate his use of the ' inscaping ' language :—

> " Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride,
> plume, here

(7) *Letters of Gerard Manly Hopkins to Robert Bridges*, Vol. I, Letter 79.

(8) *Poems by Gerard Manly Hopkins*, ed. by Robert Bridges, Second edition (London, 1930), Poem 34.

> Buckle ! AND the fire that breaks from thee then, a billion
> Times told lovelier, more dangerous, O my chevalier !"

Each word startlingly brings to the fore some individuating quality of the falcon. Against this, the lines from " Gerontion " strike a different note:—

> ' Signs are taken for wonders. " We would see a sign !"
> The Word within a word, unable to speak a word,
> Swaddled with darkness. In the juvescence of the year
> Came Christ the tiger. '

In Eliot the words have a generic significance, and through their interplay awaken an awareness that is universal and eternal.

As a result of his individuating aim the language of Hopkins becomes inevitably concrete, colourful, and personal. On the other hand Eliot seeks to communicate in a tongue that only the spirit of humanity can hear through the medium of man.

In Hopkins' theory of poetic communication the self is supreme whereas in Eliot the self is eliminated, the "objective correlative " of experience is created through adequate words and images.

Perhaps the poetic language can never be the language of men. It may continue to remain " the best words in the best order." Yet the fact remains that Hopkins and Eliot have consciously attempted a return to the language of men. It is clear that they had the intention of making the language an authentic voice of the spirit of man.

But in either of the poets, the language has actually ceased to be " the language of men." It is the " heightened language " as Hopkins described his own inscaping language or, in Eliot, the language bringing about the dissociation of sensibility. The poetic art in both these poets has inevitably become a highbrow exclusiveness, demanding a sensibility that is the product of a sophisticated culture.

THE BHAGAVAD-GITA AND THE SONG CELESTIAL

BY

H. N. L. SASTRI

IN his preface to *The Song Celestial*, Sir Edwin Arnold states that he undertook the English translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, because he felt that " English literature would certainly be incomplete without possessing in popular form a poetical and philosophical work so dear to India." He adds:—

> So striking are some of the moralities here inculcated, and so close the parallelism—oftentimes actually verbal—between its teachings and those of the *New Testament*, that a controversy has arisen between the Pundits and Missionaries on the point whether the author borrowed from Christian sources, or the Evangelists and Apostles from him.[1]

His plea that the West should be acquainted with one of the greatest religious texts of India is, indeed, commendable. Arnold's hope, however, that he could give a *popular form* of the *Gita* to his readers must be considered an error of judgment. That he was able to popularise the life of the Buddha in *The Light of Asia* was no guarantee that he would be able to do as much for a profound philosophical work like the *Gita*. Essentially, *The Light of Asia* was a colourful romance akin at many points to the Gospel stories; even readers who were not interested in its philosophy could enjoy it simply as a narrative. But in the *Bhagavad-Gita*, the story interest is rather negligible, being confined practically to the first chapter; the rest of the work—seventeen chapters—deals with a number of religious and philosophical issues, not presented as a reasoned argument, but as unschematized, prophetic and poetic utterances. To imagine a *popular* form of such a subtle and complex work—the subject of more than forty-four commentaries in Sanskrit alone—is very difficult, for even a slight error in the translation of a term might substantially alter the doctrine expounded. Arnold's decision, then, to translate the *Gita* in blank verse was a bold venture indeed.

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(1) *The Song Celestial* (Boston, 1895), p. ii.

It should not be difficult to understand why the *Gita* has always evoked a sympathetic response from the Western mind. A close scrutiny of the texts of the *Gita* and the *New Testament* will reveal an intimate correspondence of thought and expression. It might be interesting to mention here a few parallelisms:—

Bhagavad-Gita	*New Testament*
I am exceedingly dear to the wise man; he is also dear to me (VII, 17).	He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him (John, XIV, 21).
I am the way, supporter, lord, witness, abode, refuge, friend (IX, 18).	I am the way, the truth, and the life (John, XIV, 6). I am the first and the last (Rev. I, 17).
I never depart from him (the devotee), he never departs from me (VI, 30).	He dwelleth in me and I in Him (John, VI, 57).
They who worship me with true devotion are in me and I in them (VI, 29).	I in them and they in me, that they be made perfect in one (John, XVII, 23).
Be assured that he who worships me perishes not (IX, 31).	He that believeth in me shall never perish, but shall have eternal life (John, III, 5).
I am the beginning and the middle and the end of existing things (X, 20).	I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending (Rev. I, 8).
I will deliver thee from sin; be not grieved (XVIII, 66).	Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee (Matt. IX, 2).
He who knows me as unborn and without beginning, the mighty lord of the world, he among mortals is undeluded: he is delivered from all sins (X, 3).	This is the life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent (John, XVII, 3).

It is not surprising, therefore, to understand the popularity of this philosophical poem among the Western readers.[2]

In 1885, three years after Davies' scholarly translation of the *Gita* had appeared, Sir Edwin Arnold published his verse translation under the title of *The Song Celestial*. Arnold mentions the translations of the *Gita* by Lassen, Galanos, Thomson, Telang and Davies in his " Preface, " and states that he undertook the translation in order to enrich English literature by the addition of this Eastern jewel. But he translated as a poet caring more for the poetry of the original than for the exact and precise connotations of the terms used in the *Gita*, some of which are highly technical. The nature of the confusion created by Arnold's inability to adequately render the philosophical terminology may now be illustrated. After each Sanskrit term, I shall present within brackets the English word which is closest in meaning to it.

Dharma (duty), Arnold translates it as " piety " (*SC* I, 116-9), " honourable " (*SC* II, 114), " faith " (*SC* cc, 142), " sacred " (*SC* I, 1). There are a number of words, however, which Arnold also translates as

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(2) The *Gita* was first translated into English by Sir Charles Welkins in 1785, with a preface by the Governor-General of India, Warren Hastings. A French version of this work appeared in 1787 at Paris. Despite their honourable origins, however, neither of these translations can be regarded *as* a scholarly work, for they give no more than a general idea of the *Gita*. In Germany, August Wilhelm von Schlegel published a very literal translation of the *Gita* at Bonn in 1823. This was followed by a greatly improved and augmented edition in 1846 by Christian Lassen. A more scholarly translation was made by the Greek Orientalist, Demetrios Galanos, who prepared it at Benares, with the assistance of a Brahmin, Shri Kandaradasa. This Greek translation was published in Athens in 1846. Cockburn Thomas published an English translation of the *Gita* in 1855 and wrote an elaborate introduction on the philosophy of the Hindus: he also included an exhaustive index of the proper names found in the *Gita*. This work shows the clear advance made in the knowledge of Sanskrit by Western scholars. In 1869 a new German translation of the *Gita* by Dr. Lorinser suggested that the *Gita* was written under Christian influence. The first Indian to publish an English translation of the *Gita* was Shri Kashinath Triambak Telang (Bombay, 1875). In 1882, Telang's translation was included in the *Sacred Books of the East* series edited by Professor Friedrich Max Muller.

Even more scholarly is the work of John Davies, who published a translation of the *Gita* in 1882. In the preparation of this work, Davies mentions that he consulted not only the previous translations of the *Gita* by Western scholars but also the commentaries of Sankara and Sridhara. Davies discusses the main philological problems at the end of each chapter often refuting the views of Thomas and Telang. His introduction and the notes are very valuable indeed.

" faith." For example, *jnana* (knowledge) (*BG* VII, 18; *SC* VII, 63), *bhakti* (devotion), (*BG* VIII, 22; *SC* VIII, 84), *yoga* (discipline) (*BG* VIII, 10; *SC* VIII, 45), *samatvam* (sameness) (*BG V*, 19; *SC* V, 64), are all translated as " faith." This confusion is further increased by his translation of these words in a variety of ways: *jnana* (knowledge), Arnold translates variously as " truth " (*SC* IV, 63; 92; 138;), as " light " (*SC* VI, 25), as " devotion " (*SC* XVIII, 182), as " holy " (*SC* XV, 44), as " faith " (*SC* V, 59). He translates " *yoga* " (*discipline*) not only as " faith " but also as " service " (*SC* X, 25, V, 3), as " holiness " (*SC* V, 20, 21), as " religion " (*SC* VI, 52), as " peace " (*SC* VI, 107), as " heart's devotion " (*SC* XVIc, 67). The word *manas* (I accept Professor Edgerton's translation of this word as " thought-organ, " which is close to its etymological meaning), Arnold translates as " heart " (*SC* VI, 86, 102, 114), as " soul " (*SC* VII, 1), as " life " (*SC* VII, 12), as " desire " (*SC* VIII, 51). The word, *atman* (soul) Arnold translates as " self " (*SC* VI, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19), as " life-soul " (*SC* VI, 93), as " spirit " (*SC* VI, 45). He translates *satva* (goodness) as " light " (*SC* XIV, 17), as " lustre " (*SC* XIV, 73), as " true " (*SC* XIII, 14), as " true belief " (*SC* XVIc, 68), as " true knowledge " (*SC* XVII, 66).

From these examples it is clear that, whatever else Arnold might have achieved in his translation of the *Gita*, he certainly did not achieve any scholarly precision. To illustrate further, I shall document in detail his interpretation of at least one of the major doctrines of this great religious poem—God and Man.

The starting point of the *Gita's* theism may be traced as far back as the *Purusa Sukta* (*Rig Veda*, X, 90), which says that one-quarter of the *Purusa* is spread out as the Cosmic Universe and its living beings, while three-quarters are in the immortal heavens. This passage is repeated in the *Chandogya Upanisad* (III, 12, 6) and in the *Maitrayani* (VI, 4). The same idea appears in the *Katha Upanisad* (VI, 1), where the universe is presented as an eternal *Asvattha* (pipul) tree

which has its roots high up and its branches downward.[3] The *Gita* expands this idea and says that the *Asvattha* (pipul) tree has its roots high, the branches below, with the *Vedas* for its leaves (XV, 1). In the next stanza, it is expounded that the branches of the tree extend below and upward, with the objects of sense as its sprouts; its roots are spread downwards tied with the knots of *Karma* (action) in the human world (XV, 2). Furthermore, the true nature of the tree

(3) Davies thinks that the episode of the Fig Tree which the *Gita* develops is an attack on the authority of the *Vedas*, since it implies that a passive state of indifference to all worldly states is superior to the observance of the Vedic Sacrificial rites. To Davies, the *Asvattha* tree symbolises the Vedic rites, which must be " cut " before the quest for the Ultimate Reality begins.

Arnold, however, rejects Davies's view and rightly holds that the simile of the *Asvattha* is a beautiful lyrical episode, a new " Parable of the Fig Tree. " But it is surprising that Arnold, who translated the *Katha Upanisad* in the same year (1885) as he published the *Gita* should have missed the symbolical significance of the fig tree. Indeed, quotations from the *Katha Upanisad* are frequent in Arnold's essays.

After stating that the simile of the fig tree is a lyrical passage, Arnold proceeds with characteristic persistence to justify his attitude by describing its foliage:

its silver sprays and blooms
And all the eager verdure of its girth,
Leap to quick life at touch of sun and air (*SC* XV, 8-11).

This pastoral tone is maintained throughout this passage, the emphasis being on the prettiness of the parts of the tree rather than the underlying doctrine.

Yet Arnold is partly aware of some symbolism in the fig tree; he represents the " hanging rootlets " as symbols of the *karmic* deeds of men, which tighten the bonds to the world (*SC* XV, 14-5). The shoots, which in Arnold's version grow skyward, symbolise the strength and devotion of a robust soul who will not become a victim of

" What breeze
" Of summer pleasure stirs the sleeping trees,
What blast of tempest tears them."

(*SC* XV, 30-32). In other words, the sight of the fig tree is a silent sermon exhorting men to renounce the world of senses and look heavenward for God's mercy. The heaven towards which, according to Arnold, the fig tree points, offers brighter and happier lives to men. The *Gita's* description of the transcendental part of God,

The sun does not illumine that
Nor the moon nor fire (*BG* XV, 6)

Arnold turns into:

Another sun gleams ! another Moon
Another Light: a Light which none shall lack
Whose eyes once see (SC XV, 34-6).

Sanskrit offers no difficulty to the translator at this point; moreover, Davies could have helped Arnold if there had been a problem. Davies translates this verse as: " That (seat) no sun enlightens, nor moon nor fire. . . (Davies, 151).

is not understood in this world; its beginning, its end, and the nature of its subsistence remain unknown; it is only by cutting this firmly rooted *Asvattha* (pipul) tree with the strong axe of detachment that one can realise the state of eternal bliss (XV, 3, 4). It is clear that the *Gita* has only elaborated the simile of the *Katha Upanisad*. It is supposed that these branches have further leaves and other roots which draw sap from the human world, to which they are attached by the ties of *karma* (action). This expansion of the original image involves a duplication of the *Asvattha* tree, the main tree and its subsidiary growth due to the *karmic* sap in the human world. This is the same thing as saying that we have to free ourselves from all *karma* (action) before reaching the Ultimate Reality.

This key simile throws light on the *Gita* conception of God which, as we have just seen, is the same as that of the *Upanisads*. God, according to this view, is not only immanent but transcendent as well. The immanent part is the Cosmic Universe which, as the *Gita* expounds, is an emanation from Him, suffused through and through with His Essence. The transcendent part is also called the "differenceless Reality." In that part which transcends the sphere of this cosmic universe, there is no sun and moon; it is God's Highest Station, having gone to which no one returns to this cosmic universe again (XV, 6). The whole of this cosmic universe is sustained by a tiny fraction of God; a mere atom of God becomes the individual soul in this world (XV, 7), the soul then attracts the five senses and the mind which lie buried in material nature just as the wind attracts and carries away the fragrance hidden in the flowers (XV, 8). The *Gita* further expounds that God is the controlling agent of all operations in the world (XV, 13); He fills crops with their specific juices (XV, 13) and nourishes them; He dwells in the body of all living beings.

All these ideas are present in the *Upanisads*, and the *Gita* merely repeats them. There is, however, an important point in which the *Gita* makes an advance over the *Upanisadic* thought: it introduces the idea that God takes birth on the earth as man. Krishna, as God, says:

> Whenever there is a languishing of the right, and a rising up of the unright, then I send Myself forth. Though unborn, though I am eternal, though I am the Lord of all beings, resorting to My material nature, I come into being by My own mystic power (IV, 6-7).

This conception of God as capable of intimate personal relations with man, with much the same intimacy as exists between Krishna and Arjuna, makes the Personality of God concrete and living. Krishna, as God, says: " I am the father of this world, the mother, the establisher, the grandsire, the purifier, the supporter, lord, refuge and friend " (IX, 17-18).

Arnold's presentation avoids a clear statement of the *Gita* doctrine that God is both immanent and transcendent in the world. On the contrary, it establishes two entities held in contrast—God, the all-powerful; and the Created World which must look up to Him in prayerful devotion. This tendency is apparent throughout Arnold's treatment of God and Man. The *Gita* states its doctrines in simple and plain words, leaving no room for ambiguity. For instance, it describes the immanence of God in these words:

> A part just of Me in the World of the living
> Becomes the individual soul (*BG* XV, 7).

Arnold translates this by shifting the emphasis, and elaborating the idea to four lines:

> When in the world of magnified life
> The undying spirit, setting forth from Me
> Taketh on form, it draweth to itself
> From Being's storehouse. (*SC* XV, 28-34).

Phrases like " magnified life " and " Being's storehouse " are really superfluous and only tend to blur the central meaning of the verse. The phrase, " Setting forth from Me," suggests the drama of creation rather than the idea that a small part of the phenomenal world *is* God.

In the following simile of the pearls and the string which the *Gita* uses to illustrate the theory that God is the Inner Support of all that exists, the word "strung" is used to denote this relationship between God and the World:

> Than Me there is no other higher thing
> Whatsoever exists, Dhananjaya;
> On Me all this (universe) is *strung*
> Like heaps of pearls on a string. (*BG* VII, italics mine).

In translating this stanza, Arnold stresses the fact that God is the " Master " and " Maker," and then introduces

a simile in which the verb " hang, " substituted for " strung " of the original, implies that the universe *depends* on God.

> Than Me there is no other Master, Prince!
> No other Master! All these *hang* on Me
> As hangs a row of pearls upon its string.

Arnold's reluctance to present the doctrine of Immanence as the *Gita* expounds it, is obvious from many passages. In the simile of the space and the winds, the *Gita* concentrates on the exposition of the doctrine that God transcends all this universe, just as the immensity of Space transcends the winds which dwell in Space. This stanza also stresses the intimate relationship between God and Created beings:

> As constantly abides in the ether
> The great wind, that penetrates everywhere,
> So all beings
> Abide in Me, make sure of that. (*BG* XV, 6).

It is obvious that the *Gita* does not speak of the distance that separates Space and Wind; in fact there is no reference anywhere to the separation between these two entities; the whole emphasis is on the one abiding in the other. Arnold, however, introduces a line of his own interpretation to mark the distinction between the two entities, and stresses the fact that God and created beings are not one and the same. These interpolations reveal the focus of his interest:

> See! as the shoreless airs
> Move in the measureless space, *but are not Space*
> (*And Space were Space without the moving airs*);
> So all things are in Me, *but are not I* (*SC* IX, 23-6; italics mine).

Arnold's tendency to minimize the importance of divine immanence is again seen in a passage in which the *Gita* speaks of all beings as " passing into My (God's) material Nature " (*BG* IX, 7) at the end of a World-eon and issuing forth again, " taking as base My own material nature " (*BG* IX, 8). In translating this statement Arnold makes no reference to the role of material Nature; he omits the specific event of the world's merging with the primal matter, which the *Gita* characterises as " God's material Nature, " and its re-projection from the same primal matter. Instead, by using the verbs, " come " and " issue " Arnold avoids giving an accurate picture of the process of resolution and re-projection of the universe into and from God's material Nature (*SC* IX, 27-30).

And to quote the following stanza:—

> Taking as base My own material Nature
> I send forth again and again
> This whole host of beings,
> Which is powerless by the power of (My) material Nature (*BG* IX, 8).

These lines stress the fact that God projects this universe from His own material Nature, and the entire host of beings are sustained by no other power than the material nature of God. In all these stanzas, the point which the *Gita* attempts to establish is that God is the absolute sustaining power which brings forth this Universe, supports it and withdraws it "at the closing of each Kalpa." Arnold, in his rendering, introduces another Cosmic category not mentioned at this point in the *Gita*—Energy. He also characterises *prakriti* (material Nature) as the "outer self" and qualifies the Universe as the "realm of visible things;" (*SC* IX, 31-5). But none of these ideas are found in the original text of the *Gita*.

In order to stress the idea that God is the Inner Principle of all beings, the *Gita* uses such verbs as "becoming" (XV, 13-4), "dwelling" (XV, 14), "digest" (XV, 14), "am entered" (XV, 15), "am" (XV, 15), thus leaving no doubt as to the identity of God and the object concerned:

> And *entering* into earth
> I nourish all plants
> *Becoming* the juicy Soma
>
> I, *becoming* the digestive fire of all men,
> *Dwelling* in the body of (all) living beings
> In union with the upper and nether breaths
> *Digest* their food of all four sorts.
>
> I *am entered* into the heart of every one;
> From me come memory, knowledge, and disputation;
> I alone am that which is to be known by all the Vedas;
> (*BG* XV, 13 ff.) (Italics mine).

In the translation of this passage, Arnold's usage of the verbs misrepresents the original text; the impression he conveys is that God, as the creator of the world, *bestows* the characteristic qualities of the elements of this universe. Note, for instance, the usage of such verbs as "gathered" (XV, 58), "draws," (*SC* XV. 60), "penetrate... and lend" (*SC* XV, 61), "glide...to make" (*SC* XV, 62-3), "glow...and pass" (*SC* XV, 65).

In view of all this evidence it is not surprising that Arnold should be faithful to the original in passages which describe God as the Father and stress the intimate personal relationship between Him and man. Arnold's rendering of the famous passage of the *Gita* where Krishna affirms that He comes into being, age after age, for the establishment of righteousness is thus quite accurate.

In a number of verses beginning from *BG* XIII, 13, the *Gita* describes *Brahman*, the Impersonal Absolute, and places the word, *Brahman*, grammatically in the neuter gender. In Professor Edgerton's translation, the pronoun "it" is used to denote the Ultimate Reality, the Impersonal Absolute, and in verses 13 to 20, the third person neuter pronoun occurs six times. In Arnold's translation of the same number of verses, the third person *masculine* is used thirteen times, in addition to words like "sustainer," "guide," "Master," and so on (not found in the *Gita*), all referring to the Personal aspect of God. Throughout this passage it is the power, might and benevolence of a Personal God that Arnold emphasizes.

Thus in the interpretation of the *Gita's* conception of God, Arnold emphasizes the Fatherhood of God, and the status of the Created world as being distinctly subordinate, and humbly submissive, to God. He avoids, wherever possible, the specific mention of divine immanence and transcendence which the *Gita* so strongly affirms.

Apart from this, it may be observed that Arnold's use of language in *The Song Celestial* does not adequately represent the directness and simplicity of the original text. The *Gita* is plain and direct both in thought and expression. Although its diction is archaic at places and does not always conform to the strict rules of grammar laid down by the Sanskrit grammarian, Panini, the text never loses its simplicity and directness of expression. The similes and metaphors used are apt, simple, and close to the experience of daily life: for example, the soul is said to assume new bodies, like a man casting aside worn-out garments and wearing new clothes (*BG* II, 22); a man, in terms of another simile, should withdraw from the world of senses like a tortoise withdrawing its organs into its shell (*BG* II, 58); a man whose mind is disciplined is like a lamp, that flickers not, stationed in a windless place (*BG* VI, 18).

Arnold's translation in general does not match this simplicity and directness. His language is ornate and periphrastic. A simple question like " What did they do ?" (*kim akurvata*?) (*BG* I, 1) becomes, " What wrought my people? " (*SC* I, 3). A plain statement in the *Gita* such as,

> When women are corrupted,
> mixture of caste ensues (*BG* I, 41)

is rendered in *The Song Celestial* as:

> Its women grow unwomaned, when there spring
> Mad passions (*SC* I, 120-1).

Besides, Arnold's almost compulsive need to embellish the original text by adopting a lofty, " heroic " manner often invests his translation with a tone of bombast and rhetoric. For instance, the *Gita* states that the Universal soul is indestructible; " that by which all this world is pervaded is indestructible/destruction of the imperishable no one causes " (*BG* II, 17). Arnold, striving for a mighty periodic structure, renders it thus:—

> Indestructible
> Learn thou, the Life is, spreading life through all.
> It cannot anywhere, by any means
> Be anywise diminished, stayed or changed (*SC* II, 55-8).

The metre employed in the *Gita* is the *sloka*, developed from the Vedic *Anustubh* (a form consisting of four quarter-verses each containing eight syllables). The *sloka* consists of two unrhymed lines of sixteen syllables, each broken by a caesura at the end of the eighth syllable. Each line of sixteen syllables is divided into four feet of four syllables. The fourth foot must be iambic (—'—'); the second foot may, however, assume four different forms, the first and the third foot remaining undetermined. The normal pattern of the second foot is —" . The typical *sloka* may, therefore, be represented thus:

. . . . / — " / . . . . / — ' — '

The end of a *pada* or quarter-verse coincides with the end of a word (sometimes only with the end of a word in a compound), and the whole *sloka* constitutes a complete sentence.

In the more lyrical parts of the *Gita*, such as the eleventh chapter where the Vision of God is described, the lines grow longer and more solemn, and contain eleven syllables for each quarter-verse, the caesura occurring at the end of the fifth syllable. This metre is called *Tristubh*.

Arnold generally uses unrhymed verse in *The Song Celestial* but varies the metre at many places. The metres used by him are: blank verse, fourteeners, trochaic trimeter couplets, six-line stanzas of tri-and penta-meter (3, 3, 5, 3, 3, 5) rhyming *a a b c c b*. The effect of the Sanskrit *sloka* deepening with the intensity of the thought is indeed majestic. Arnold's attempt to produce the same effect in English verse by adopting the form of Milton's *Nativity Ode* at one place and rhyming heptameters at other places fails to achieve its purpose. From the dignified repose of the blank verse the reader suddenly tumbles into a jingling current of sing-song rhyme, mostly inappropriate to the idea expressed. In the original the metre becomes more solemn as the hero, in the presence of the self-transforming Supreme God, describes with dread what he beholds—God in His destructive aspect, devouring nations. Arnold's version suggests less dread or awe than noise and turmoil.

The *Gita* describes God the Destroyer in the *Tristubh* metre: a line which may be literally translated as:—

> I am Time, the World-Destroyer; ancient, I come to destroy generations.

Arnold's rhymed elaboration loses both the dignity and the awe of the original:—

> Thou see'st me as Time who kills,—Time who brings all to doom
>
> The slayer Time, Ancient of Days, come hither to consume. (*SC* XI, 201-2).

Finally, in the passage in which Krishna discourses on the mystery of life as a flash between two darknesses, Arnold breaks into this singular rhyming:

> Wonderful, wistful to contemplate!
> Difficult, doubtful to speak upon!
> Strange and great for tongue to relate,
> Mystical hearing for every one!
> Not wotteth man this, what a marvel it is
> When seeing and saying and hearing are done!
> (*SC* II, 99-104).

Arnold's blank verse, fortunately, is more successful in capturing the spirit of the original than his other metres. His translation of the First Book of the *Gita* in which the two armies stand arrayed against each other, has the ring of an epic battle. The epic note and the tone of high solemnity, however, are too seldom struck in *The Song Celestial*. Arnold's verse, like his presentation of the theme, is more often popular than profound, mundane than celestial.

1. To avoid heavy footnotes I have given references to quoted material within brackets at the end of each passage.

The abbreviations used are *SC* for the *The Song Celestial* and *BG* for the *Bhagavad-Gita*. All references to *The Song Celestial* are to the 1895 edition published by Robert Brothers, Boston.

2. I have followed Shri Shripad Krishna Belvalkar's critical edition of the *Bhagavad-Gita*, published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1945.

The English translations of the *Gita* which refer to the "original" are all from Professor Franklin Edgerton's admirable translation of the *Gita* (*The Bhagavad-Gita*, Harvard University Press, 1952), which is not only scholarly, but follows the *Gita* verses as literally as possible. All subsequent references to the *Gita*, incorporated in the text in parenthesis, are to this edition. In the interpretation of the *Gita* doctrine, I have consulted Sir S. Radhakrishnan's scholarly translation of the *Gita*, Shri Aurobindo Ghose's *Essays on the Gita*, and the works of Western scholars, principally, Cockburn Thomas, John Davies and Franklin Edgerton, in addition to a number of learned articles too numerous to mention here.

THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN T. S. ELIOT'S *THE FOUR QUARTETS*

BY

V. MADHUSUDAN REDDY

' The river is within us, the sea is all about us '

The Dry Salvages

ALTHOUGH in *The Four Quartets*[1] T. S. Eliot is primarily concerned with the concept of time, he also presents other aspects of human experience. In the various movements of the *Quartets* Eliot explores many themes—the individual, the generic and the historic.[2] And it is through expanded symbols and suggestive allusions that he conveys his sense of progress from easy scepticism to lasting certitude. This method of ironic implication is considered particularly significant in an age of universal disvalue and disbelief. T. S. Eliot employs this method with a view to avoiding all direct state-

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(1) These are four long poems, in a new form, described by T. S. Eliot as ' quartets.' The first poem is ' Burnt Norton,' which was published as the concluding poem of Eliot's *Collected Poems*, 1909-1935. ' Burnt Norton ' heralded a sequence, and in due course was followed by ' East Coker ' (1940), ' The Dry Salvages ' (1941), and ' Little Gidding ' (1943). Although each poem is complete in itself, all the poems, together, form a unity. Each single poem is divided into five movements, and each is also named after a place: *Burnt Norton*—an old house in Gloucestershire; *East Coker*—the Somerset village from which Eliot's family originally came; *The Dry Salvages*—named after three small islands off the coast of Cape Ann; and *Little Gidding*, a village in Huntingdonshire which gave shelter to the defeated king Charles.

(2) As T. S. Eliot reminds us, we are not dealing with

' . . . the lifetime of one man only
But of old stones that cannot be deciphered.'

East Coker, V.

and ' . . . the past experience revived in the meaning
Is not the experience of one life only
But of many generations.'

The Dry Salvages, ii.

ments with which the readers may not agree.[3] The variety of styles in the *Quartets* ranges from epigrammatic brilliance to such beautiful lyric interludes as the sestines of *The Dry Salvages*. By using the elemental symbols of air, earth, water and fire in *The Four Quartets* Eliot successfully presents those perfectly satisfying embodiments of " a long sought truth which gives at once the impression of recognition and of discovery."

In fact what Eliot tries to say about time cannot be reduced to the simple dimensions of a concept, for it is in the synthetic correlation of all the different areas of experience that the full significance of Eliot's concept of time lies. *Burnt Norton* opens with :

> ' Time present and time past
> Are both perhaps present in time future
> And time future contained in time past '[4]

There are in this stanza two distinct dimensions, or orders of being, the order of time and the order of eternity. Time constitutes an essential distinction between the eternal order and the temporal order. Its significance, meaning and import are generally assumed as common knowledge. Since time, like space, is a necessary condition of thought, it eludes definition:

> ' And yet what in our usual discourse do we more familiarly and knowingly make mention of than Time? And surely we understand it well enough, when we speak of it: we understand it also, when in speaking with another we hear it named. What is Time then? If nobody asks me, I know: but if I were desirous to explain to one that should ask me, plainly I know not.'
>
> —ST. AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*

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(3) For example in *Burnt Norton*, ii, he interprets the chaos of the world in a manner that no longer presents itself as chaotic:—

> ' Erhebung without motion, concentration
> Without elimination, both a new world
> And the old made explicit, understood
> In the completion of its partial ecstasy,
> The resolution of its partial horror.'

(4) T. S. Eliot, *The Four Quartets* (London, 1949), p. 7.

The more closely we examine the concept of time, the more elusive and puzzling it appears.[5] Philosophers, therefore, deny the existence of time in the external world and confine it to the inner world of experience. Kant, for instance, describes it as a purely subjective condition of human perception. According to him time is a principle by which events are shown to be connected in experience. Plato conceives of time as " the moving image of eternity " and, in so far as it is moving, it is not eternity. It is neither change nor the changeless. It is that aspect of change which bridges the gap, as it were, between change and the immutability of the eternal nature.[6] Time as a moving image of eternity, thus, makes the motion of the sensible universe appear harmonious and intelligible. Time is, therefore, placed midway between eternity and mere becoming as it contains within itself something of both.[7]

Time, so conceived, becomes a source of moral good for man, as well as of physical good for the universe.

> ' . . . the enchantment of past and future
> Woven in the weakness of the changing body,
> Protects mankind from heaven and damnation
> Which flesh cannot endure.'
>
> *Burnt Norton*

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(5) " Time, which is—Heaven knows what ! "

A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (London 1933), p. ix.

" . . . so little do we understand Time . . . "

James Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe* (London, 1937), p. 183.

(6) " We can only think of motion as in time, for time is just the measure of motion."

Burnet: *Greek Philosophy*, Part I, *Thales to Plato*, p. 342, (London, 1914), Part I.

(7) ' It is a projection of the intelligible into the sensible order and is appropriately described in mythical form as the product of a divine intelligence that fashions its handiwork after an intelligible model.'

John F. Callahan: *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 191.

Eliot, like Plotinus, cannot help regarding time as a lower stage in a hierarchy above which man should ascend. His moral concept of time, therefore, implies that man should transcend it to be able to rise to eternity. Plotinus' view of time, however, is metaphysical rather than psychological. For him time exists independently of the perceiving soul. His view of memory, which perceives the flow of time, anticipates St. Augustine's attitude towards it. For St. Augustine, as for Aristotle, time is the measure of motion, though in a different sense. For Aristotle time is a physical measure that possesses many characteristics of the motion that it measures. But St. Augustine removes time from the realm of the physical and places it in the soul of man. Time is an activity of the soul by which man measures motion in the physical universe. Whereas for Plotinus time is rather the cause of motion and is not essentially a measure. Time, therefore, which is treated metaphorically by Plato as the moving image of eternity, physically by Aristotle as the measure of motion, metaphysically by Plotinus as the productive life of the soul, psychologically by St. Augustine as an activity of the soul, assumes a new dimension in the *Quartets*—the ethical aspect of time.

> ' Only through time time is conquered '
>
> *Burnt Norton*

This ethical concept of time leads Eliot to present this life as a distention or distraction in the moral sense. The soul thus dispersed could hope to rise with God's grace to the contemplation of Him, which alone would pull it out of the involvement in a temporal existence. Consciousness belongs to the order of eternity, and to the order of time belongs evil and ignorance.

> ' Time past and time future
> Allow but a little consciousness.
> To be conscious is not to be in time
> But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden
> . . . . . .
> Be remembered, involved with past and future.'
>
> *Burnt Norton*

Eliot always presents Time and Eternity as polarities. This theme is constantly repeated in different symbolical contexts to bring out the depth of the cleavage.

'After the kingfisher's wing
Has answered light to light, and is silent, the light is still
At the still point of the turning world.'

Burnt Norton

But he is also keen on affirming their interdependence, or rather the dependence of Time on Eternity. It is the Eternity of the Absolute that wells out into the flow of Time.

'Or say that the end precedes the beginning
And the end and the beginning were always there
Before the beginning and after the end
And all is always now.'

Burnt Norton

In a higher consciousness, therefore, the polarity between Time and Eternity will appear to be reconciled. This supreme consciousness is nothing but the redeeming power of Divine Love—; it is the Grace and Glory of God. Love is that embodiment of the Eternal in Time which carries with it the stamp and sanction of immortality.

"Eternity drew close disguised as Love
And laid its hands upon the body of Time."[8]

According to Sri Aurobindo, desire and death are the twin shadows of love. Love and desire seem to embody two contradictory principles, one affirming the divine eternity and immortality, the other implying the perpetuation of mortality. *Savitri*, his great epic, raises the whole problem to its cosmic proportions and brings in the necessary divine elements whose intervention alone can lead to a successful resolution of such irreconcilables as love, desire and death. This problem finds expression in the Vedic hymns, and in the aspiration of the Upanishadic Seer who chants: "from death lead me to immortality." Conquest over desire and death, attainment of immortality during our life on this earth, has been the dream of man since the dawn of his awakening. It is the same affirmation that seeks expression in Eliot's *Burnt Norton:*

'Desire itself is movement
Not in itself desirable;
Love is itself unmoving,
Only the cause and end of movement,

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(8) Sri Aurobindo: *Savitri*, Book II, Canto 9 (Pondicherry, 1954).

Timeless, and undesiring
Except in the aspect of time
Caught in the form of limitation
Between unbeing and being.'

In one of his lyric-interludes in the fourth movement of *Little Gidding*, Eliot makes use of the elemental symbol of fire, whose nature is finally defined as " the flame of that person to whom Love is appropriated as His title."[9]

Who then devised the torment? Love.
Love is the unfamiliar Name
Behind the hands that wore
The intolerable shirt of flame
Which human power cannot remove.

We only live, only suspire
Consumed by either fire or fire.

The Dry Salvages

The Four Quartets are ingeniously linked together by a recurring pattern of symbols and themes. While the poet's vision explores the pattern of individual life in *Burnt Norton* and that of mankind in *East Coker*, it unveils the image of history in *The Dry Salvages* and returns upon a final statement of transfiguration in *Little Gidding*. The first movement of *East Coker* opens with the statement:

In my beginning is my end

which fades into a contrapuntal statement, to establish the continuity of human experience:

In my end is my beginning

For, ' what we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from '

—*Little Gidding*

The beginning and the end are, therefore, two points on the Divine Circle. The pure religious consciousness lies in a region which is for ever beyond all proof or disproof. The mystical comprehension of the Divine Circle is beyond the range of conceptualisation or expression. It is only through an intuitional process, not intellectual, that God may be realised by man.

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(9) M. C. Bradbrook, *T. S. Eliot* (London, 1950), p. 13.

T. S. Eliot uses religious terminology very sparingly in the *Quartets* except in such passages as those on the virtue of detachment in *East Coker*, or the dark night of the soul in *Little Gidding*:

> In order to possess what you do not possess
> You must go by the way of dispossession.

The Dry Salvages clearly establishes the connection between the river of life and the ocean of history, and makes us aware:

> 'That the past has another pattern, and ceases to be a mere sequence—
> Or even development.'

The importance of time as a significant aspect of human experience has rarely been questioned. But what is needed for philosophic thought is a certain emancipation from slavery to time, or in Russell's words, "to realise the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom."[10] As against this Alexander retorts: "...to realize the importance of time as such is the gate of wisdom."[11] And even from the idealistic point of view the problem of time " is the ultimate crux of speculation."[12] There is, however, a shift in emphasis in Eliot who, like Croce and Gentile, insists on the importance of history and the time-process:

> I have said before
> That the past experience revived in the meaning
> Is not the experience of one life only
> But of many generations.
>
> *The Dry Salvages*

Past, present and future, considered as entities detached from experience, become mere abstractions. Bergson, therefore, conceives time as *durée* which is not a mere blank everlastingness enduring through a hypostatized, spatialized time, but a ceaseless, continuous flow. *Durée*, according to him, is not only real: it is Reality itself.

> I do not know much about gods; but I think
> Is a strong brown god.....
>
> *The Dry Salvages*

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(10) Bertrand Russell, *Knowledge of the External World* (London, 1915), p. 167.

(11) Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (London, 1927), p. 36.

(12) Bosanquet, *Meeting of Extremes* (London, 1921), p. 125.

Durée should not be equated with mere duration; it is experience realised *directly* as a ceaseless flow. Consequently Bergson's attitude to metaphysics is intuitional rather than intellectual. " A true empiricism is that which proposes to get as near to the original itself as possible,. . . and so, by a kind of *intellectual auscultation*, to feel the throbbing of its soul."[13]

Bergson distinguishes very clearly between time in its flow and time as passed. The latter, he considers, is a mere spatial entity, whereas the former is a creative unity. " Time is not a line on which we can pass again."[14] Bergson completely rejects the conception of time as a trajectory and of ourselves as progressing to meet future events that have " been there " all the time. Eliot here agrees with Bergson and regards the two usual alternatives—' What was done but what could have been done ' and ' what was done and what couldn't have been done ' as both open to the same criticism. They are based on a wrong conception of events as mapped out in space. Bergson, however, does not merely imply that at a particular point we are ignorant of what has been and what might have been, he only means that we could not know the past and the future for the distinction between the past and the future is both epistemological and ontological. Reality, therefore, is a perpetual process of ceaseless becoming. " It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made."[15] And the pure present is only " the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future."[16]

> ' Time past and time future
> What might have been and what has been,
> Point to one end, which is always present.'
>
> *Burnt Norton*

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(13) Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. T. E. Hulme (London, 1913), p. 31.

(14) Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (London 1921), p. 181.

(15) Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (London 1944), p. 287.

(16) Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (London 1913), p. 794.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES ON E.M. FORSTER: HENRY JAMES—A STUDY IN AMBIVALENCE

BY

V. A. SHAHANE

ALTHOUGH E. M. Forster has been studied and assessed by competent critics like Lionel Trilling, F. R. Leavis, I. A. Richards, Virginia Woolf, D. S. Savage, J. C. Ransom, Austin Warren, yet his relationship to the tradition of the English novel has been neither completely established nor critically analysed. I may say that neither Trilling, whose criticism of Forster is perceptive nor Rose Macaulay whose monograph on Forster is a " chattily descriptive guide "[1] has dealt with this particular aspect of Forster. Rose Macaulay,[2] Trilling,[3] Rex Warner,[4] J. K. Johnstone,[5] John McConkey[6] deal almost exclusively with E. M. Forster in himself and make no substantial contribution to the ' placing ' of Forster in the tradition of the English novel.

My aim in this paper is to trace and analyse the influence of Henry James on E. M. Forster. With a view to imposing a scheme on the sprawling problem of tracing influences, the scope of this inquiry is narrowed down to a consideration of only the significant aspects of James's impact on Forster.

The impact of other writers on Forster such as Jane Austen is fairly assumed and understood, though not clearly amplified, by many critics of Forster. The influence of

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(1) F. R. Leavis, *The Common Pursuit* (London 1951), p. 261.

(2) Rose Macaulay, *The Writings of E. M. Forster* (London, 1938).

(3) Lionel Trilling, *E. M. Forster: A Study* (London, 1944). It is true that Rose Macaulay's conversational tone " is achieved at the expense of unity of treatment." (*The Times Literary Supplement*, A Review, March 9, 1938, p. 185). Yet it is equally true that Dr. Leavis demonstrates his " high tone of voice " in his pronouncement on Trilling's brilliant work on Forster. Dr. Leavis believes that Trilling " in the interests of significance " allows his work to lapse into " an almost adolescent poeticality." (*Scrutiny*, Autumn 1944, Vol. XII, p. 308).

(4) Rex Warner, *E. M. Forster* (London, 1950).

(5) J. K. Johnstone, *The Bloomsbury Group* (London, 1954).

(6) John McConkey, *The Novels of E. M. Forster* (Cornell, 1957).

Samuel Butler on Forster's ideas is analysed[7] at some length by L. E. Holt. George Meredith's influence on Forster, in relation to attitudes and literary devices, though not yet clearly demonstrated, is too pervasive to be missed by the critical eye. Jane Austen, Samuel Butler, and George Meredith contribute to the current of the tradition which is English in essence. Forster is also influenced by the writings of Turgenev and Marcel Proust. Henry James, Turgenev and Proust make their contribution to the tradition of the novel which is essentially European and continental in character.

The term ' tradition ' is used in this essay in its purely historical connotation—as a significant continuity and link between the past and the present. Every creative writer is faced with the problem of relating his inherited past to the present, and in this process, makes his own contribution to it. Tradition, according to T. S. Eliot, is not a hereditary legacy which is automatically and effortlessly acquired. " If you want it, " T. S. Eliot writes, " you must obtain it by great labour."[8] It should contain " the historical sense " and the historical sense " involves a perception not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence." Every creative writer is aware of his debt to significant writers of earlier periods and his presentation of the contemporary problem is bound up with his intelligent appreciation of the heritage. E. M. Forster, too, is indebted to significant novelists of the past and his treatment of Edwardian and Georgian societies is bound up with his intelligent appreciation of what earlier novelists could give him. Forster's achievement in terms of adapting the past—his heritage—to the literary, social and technical requirements of his times needs to be examined. In this way the ' tradition ' becomes a continual chain of significance, which can be critically discerned in a logical as well as a chronolgical order.

A consideration of the impact of Henry James on E. M. Forster is a study, in part, of Forster's relationship to the ' tradition.' One of its interesting aspects is that it is a study in ambivalence. E. M. Forster's assessment of Henry James betrays one of the most glaring weaknesses of Forster as a literary critic. "Obviously not only energy

(7) Holt, L. E., ' E. M. F. and Samuel Butler,' *P.M.L.A.*, LXI, September, 1946, p. 804.

(8) T. S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood* (London 1920), p. 49.

has failed here," writes Lionel Trilling, " but with it intelligence." [9] Forster is not at all well disposed towards Henry James yet, in effect, he is imperceptibly influenced by him. It is interesting to discover that the weaknesses which Forster discerned, under a magnifying glass, in the work of Henry James, are to be observed in his own works also.

The problem of Henry James's impact on Forster is based upon certain literary and critical assumptions. The question that naturally arises is this: what does Henry James contribute to the impact of the tradition on Forster that is new and different? What are the individualistic features of James's contribution to the tradition of the English novel which are special to him alone and are not observed among those of his contemporaries? The scope and character of James's impact on Forster has to be judged against this background of individualistic and specialised crux of James's contribution to the tradition.

One may write a whole volume on the course the James-criticism has taken in England and America. The detractors of James have been as vociferous as his admirers. [10]

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(9) Lionel Trilling, *E. M. Forster: A Study* (London, 1944), p. 143.

(10) Arnold Bennett " simply could not read " the novels of Henry James because " they did not seem " to him " to be about anything."[a] He has been described as "the most delightful literary snob of the period"[b] who was " superlatively patronizing in his attitude " toward literary methods different from his own. Howells believes that James is blind to the " incorrigible provinciality of the English."[c] He is said to be " tremendously lacking in emotional power,"[d] rather a " critic than a writer of fiction."[e] The "restricted" canvas of James's novels has also been severely criticised. W. C. Brownell finds in James a " lack of large vitality "[f]

(a) Arnold Bennett, *Things That Have Interested Me* (New York, 1921), p. 324.

(b) Julia C. Harris, ed., *Joel Chandler Harris: Editor and Essayist* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1931), p. 187.

(c) Percy Lubbock, ed., *The Letters of Henry James* (New York, 1920), Vol. I, p. 72.

(d) Francis Hackett, *Horizons: A Book of Criticism* (New York, 1918), p. 74.

(e) John Macy, *The Spirit of American Literature* (New York, 1913), p. 331.

(f) W. C. Brownell, *American Prose Masters* (New York, 1909), pp. 364-76.

Against the background of voluminous critical comments, it seems necessary to state clearly the most striking and the most individualistic characteristics of Henry James which are relevant to the tradition and their impact on E. M. Forster. It seems to me that with Henry James the novel of English (and American) society enters on a new phase in which English (and American) society and its moral types are seen critically in relation to other societies and their moral types. This is, in fact, James's supreme contribution to the English novel in subject-matter as well as technique. Henry James thus becomes relevant to, and important in, any consideration of the impact of the novel tradition on Forster.

James's achievement in the sphere of the " International Situation " is an advance in intelligence. This problem did not arise in Jane Austen's times to the extent it did in James's. Her problem was " to balance the claims of a very sensitive individual against the claims of a stable society." [11] It did not occur to her to inquire into the meaning of ' Englishness ' or into the institutions associated with it. Henry James, in spirit, is more of a modern novelist

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and compares him with Balzac whose interests are wider and who deals with all classes of men and women. James's style has been disparaged as ' ostentatious, ' ' tortuous ' and ' involved '—" more involved than the burden of their contents warrants."[g]

As against this adverse appraisal, the criticism of James, particularly in recent years, is characterised by a search after a metaphysic. Austin Warren uses the terms ' dialectic ' and ' myth '[h] in relation to dramatic dialogue and metaphorical descriptions of states of consciousness in the later novels of Henry James. The late works are proclaimed to be products of Swedenborgianism. Parks finds in Henry James an artistic exposition of William James's philosophical pragmatism.[i] Henry James as a novelist and craftsman scrupulously follows his idea of " point of view " rather than claiming the conventional authority of the novelist's omniscience. This attitude to the craft of fiction is believed to be the artistic counterpart of the pragmatist theory that truth is never completely absolute but is relative to the one who observes it. These critics claim to have discovered in Henry James a coherent system of values.

(g) E. A. Boyd, *Literary Blasphemies* (London, 1927), Chap. IX—' Henry James,' p. 213.

(h) Austin Warren, *Rage for Order* (Chicago, 1948), p. 146.

(i) Anderson, " The Two Henry Jameses," *Scrutiny*, XIV (1947), p. 242-51.

(11) F. R. Leavis, *The Great Tradition* (London, 1948), p. 127.

than the dates suggest.[12] He is an American who observes Europe and also endeavours to look at America from a detached angle. Rebecca West remarks:

> It took all Mr. James' cosmopolitan training to see that there existed an international situation, that the fact that Americans visited Europe constituted a drama.[13]

James, as an American, is stimulated and challenged by the fact that the relationship between the American and the European has not been properly portrayed and analysed. The American was an " unknown quantity " to the European and vice versa. This situation called for an effort of intelligence quite unusual on the part of novelists. The American's position in relation to Europeans and the misunderstandings it gives rise to present James with material of a subtlety for which there is no parallel in earlier fiction. James himself points out the difference between the American and the European scenes:

> One might enumerate the items of high civilization as it exists in other countries, which are absent from the texture of American life, until it should become a wonder what was left. No State, in the European sense of that word, and indeed barely a specific national name. No sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy...

In this context Ford Madox Hueffer calls James " essentially an unAmericanised American whose one immense mission was the civilising of America." [14] Praising James's contribution to the broadening of consciousness Stephen Spender calls him the first communist[15]—a strange remark in view of James's pronounced fondness for the society of decorum. Dorothy Hoare, therefore, disagrees with Stephen Spender in calling James a socialist.[16] Ford believes that James knows " the good people " in the " special English sense "—meaning not exactly the virtuous, but " the sufficiently well-born."

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(12) Henry James (1843-1916). His first significant novel depicting the life of an American sculptor appeared in 1876.

(13) Rebecca West, *Henry James* (London, 1946), p. 30.

(14) Ford Madox Hueffer, *Henry James—A Study* (London, 1913), p. 35.

(15) Stephen Spender, *The Destructive Element* (London, 1935), p. 60.

(16) Dorothy Hoare, *Some Studies in the Modern Novel* (London, 1938), p. 3.

These qualities of Englishness, intelligence and culture, are reflected in Forster. James's interests, likes, Forster's are restricted to certain grades of the upper class or the upper middle class. In treating the Schlegels and the Wilcoxes in *Howards End*, Forster also clarifies his attitude toward the poor. He writes:

> We are not concerned with the very poor. They are unthinkable, and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet. This story deals with gentle folk, or with those who are obliged to pretend that they are gentle folk.[17]

James and Forster, though they differ from each other in many respects, are both part of the very aristocracy of liberalism of their times.

In the presentation of subject-matter, the exposition of the theme and the consequent formulation of the point of view, the link between Henry James and Forster may be discerned. James' *Roderick Hudson* (1874) is, in F. R. Leavis's words:

> a dramatic study in the interplay of contrasted cultural relations by a very intelligent student of contemporary civilization.[18]

Forster's *A Room With a View* (1908), too, is a " dramatic study in the interplay of contrasted cultural relations." Forster, like James, is " a very intelligent student of contemporary civilization," with special reference to the English upper middle class.

The early James has a naivete and discursiveness of manner which accord with Forster's manner in his *The Longest Journey* phase. The stylistic finesse and punctiliousness characteristic of the later James is not quite in tune with Forster's ways of expression, presentation and style. Yet Henry James's *The Ambassadors* (1903) is very relevant and near in time to Forster's *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (1905).

The Ambassadors is a fine example of James's rendering of the ' drama of discrimination ' in the ' centre of consciousness. ' He portrays the drama of Chad and Madam de

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(17) E. M. Forster, *Howards End* (London, 1910), Chap. VI, p. 47.

(18) F. R. Leavis, *The Great Tradition* (London, 1948), p. 130.

Vionnet, the fascinations of Parisian life as against the life in Woollett—as it is reflected in Strether's mind. Strether's mind is a small, beautiful lake in which one sees the reflection of the immense sky, the clouds and the stars, the wonder and beauty of human relationships in the novel.

The change of perspective in subject-matter (' the International Situation '), in James, calls for a change in the technique of fiction. It makes for splendid effects of surprise in plots. It allows for new possibilities of ' suspense ' and ' revelation.' It is in this sphere—a newer content demanding a newer technique—that the central point of James's impact on Forster can be traced. The nature of this impact, in terms of splendid effects of surprise in plots, can be illustrated from James's *The Ambassadors* and Forster's *Where Angels Fear to Tread.*

Characters in James and Forster discover new scenes and sensations, *e.g.*, Strether discovers new aspects of Parisian culture; Philip Herriton, too, discovers newer aspects of Italy. James and Forster reveal to us the shocks Strether and Philip sustain and the reversals they undergo.

The situation in *The Ambassadors* is full of possibilities of surprise in the plot. The amiable, elderly, guileless Lambert Strether is exposed to the charms of Parisian life and of the fascinating, intelligent, sensitive Madam de Vionnet and the cosmopolitan Maria Gostrey. Strether is the ' centre ' and his ' self-revelation ' is delicately portrayed by James. James expounds the novel's theme in Strether's words:

> Live all you can; it's mistake not to. It doesn't matter what you do in particular so long as you have your own life. If you haven't had that what have you had? I'm too old...

It is a situation, in James's own words, " human, dramatic, international, exquisitely ' pure, ' exquisitely everything." Strether changes sides and this mental evolution is made highly dramatic. He, at first, believes that the relation between Chadwick Newsome and Madam de Vionnet is virtuous and ' pure.' James delicately portrays the various phases of Strether's feelings towards her :

> ...he had gone that very afternoon to see Madam de Vionnet. He had gone again the next day but one, and the effect of the two visits, the after-sense

> of the couple of hours spent with her, was almost that of fullness and frequency... if there was a danger of one's liking such a woman too much one's best safety was in waiting, at least one had the right to do so.[19]

And then the surprising boating incident occurs which reveals to Strether the nature of Chad's relationship with Madam de Vionnet. This effect of surprise seems part of James's usual pattern:

> What he (Strether) saw was exactly the right thing—a boat advancing... It was suddenly as if these figures, or something like them, had been wanted in the picture, had been wanted more or less all day, and had now drifted into sight, with the slow current, on purpose to fill up the measure.[20]

Strether realises that the occupants of the boat are Chad and Madam de Vionnet:

> ...and she had been the first at recognition, the first to feel, across the water, the shock,—for it appeared to come to that—of their wonderful accident. Strether became aware, with this, of what was taking place...that she was quickly and intensely debating with Chad the risk of betrayal. It was a sharp fantastic crisis that had popped up as if in a dream, and it had only to last the few seconds to make him feel it as quite horrible.[21]

James shows Strether sustain shocks and reversals. Strether insists on Chad's loyalty to Madam de Vionnet. In this process of self-discovery, Strether realises the real point of his destiny and experience. Paris has shown him new facets of life. It also deludes him and shows that his destiny is " to make a mistake " in life, to miss so much that life has to offer.

Forster, too, makes Philip Herriton conscious of his destiny and the issues involved in his experiences at Sawston and in Italy. Forster's portrayal of the scene of the

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(19) Henry James, *The Ambassadors* (Macmillan, 1923), Vol. II, p. 223.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 229.

(21) *Ibid*, p. 230.

Italian opera shows the Jamesian element of the splendid effect of surprise, though in a lighter vein. Forster portrays the human drama in a forthright, direct, live manner and creates an effect of freshness and spontaneity:

> So the opera ended. The singers drew inspiration from the audience... Miss Abbott fell into the spirit of the thing. She, too, chatted and laughed and applauded and encored, and rejoiced in the existence of beauty. As for Philip, he forgot himself as well as his mission.
>
> He was drunk with excitement. The heat, the fatigue, and the enjoyment had mounted into his head.
>
> He said to Miss Abbott, " The fact is—well, I got taken by surprise,... "[22]

We see Miss Abbott undergoing a complete transformation during the scene in which Gino washes his baby. Before the visit, Miss Abbott had thought " that she alone could do battle with Gino," because " she alone understood him." Forster writes:

> She had thought so much about this baby, of its welfare, its soul, its morals, its probable defects... she had only thought of it as a word. It was so much flesh and blood, so many inches and ounces of life...[23]

In Miss Abbott's reversal or 'volte face' an aspect of the 'international situation' in relation to the effect of surprise is revealed. Harriet tells Philip:

> When she got there, there was some pretty domestic scene between him and the baby, and she got swept off in a gush of sentimentalism.[24]

Forster has depicted the slow evolution of Philip's feeling for Caroline and the effect of surprise is reserved for the last scene:

> By this time he loved her very much, and he could not bear to be puzzled...' Miss Abbott, what is

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(22) E. M. Forster, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (London, 1905), p. 138.
(23) *Ibid.*, p. 145.
(24) *Ibid.*, p. 161.

> the matter with you? I thought I understood you, and I don't.' She said to him, ' I'm in love with Gino. . . .'[25]

It is in these effects of surprise and suspense, drama and revelation and strokes of felicity, that the impact of James on Forster can be discerned.

Henry James's dramatic rendering of the conflict between good and evil is ever present in the Edwardian phase of Forster's literary career. In Henry James, the ' vastation,' the malady of the James family, leads to an intuitive understanding and realisation of evil. In James's novels the concept of evil becomes externalised and concretised through a process of the corruption of the innocents abroad. In Forster, the moral issues are oddly mixed up with comic elements. The God Pan in Forster's short stories has a moral significance. He creates panic amongst middle class English tourists and Forster manipulates situations which are moral on one level and comic on the other. The Wilcoxes emerge out of a moral pattern in *Howards End*, yet we cannot help smiling at the Wilcox disease.

The points of contrast between Henry James and Forster are also significant. James's idea of Europe is quite different from Forster's. The early James thinks of Europe as a paradise of temptations—a Rome which ensnares Roderick. At a later stage we find the " pagan " Chad and Strether surrendering to the charms of Paris. James's basic theme of the innocents abroad being lured by the sophisticated is different from Forster's. Forster's Europeans are neither sophisticated nor culturally cosmopolitan. Is not Gino a provincial of a different type? Aspects of the New England Puritanism are different from those of Sawston. The peculiar nature of Strether's beguilement lies in the peculiar qualities of the New Englander: his innocence, tolerance, understanding. The interaction of innocence and age-old sophistication is fraught with great dramatic possibilities.

Henry James revels in analysing a fine psychological situation and exploiting its dramatic possibilities. Forster, too, aims at creating drama, but in a live, direct, forthright manner making for spontaneity in action and presentation.

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(25) E. M. Forster, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (London, 1905), p. 201.

The dramatic effect—of surprise or suspense—in James smacks of a well-thought-out pattern. Unlike Forster, James exploits the after-effects of action—in the chamber of consciousness. There is always some distance between the actual event and its dramatic repercussions. Forster disapproves of this remoteness between action and recollection; spontaneous feeling and emotion recollected in tranquillity. This difference in attitude, partly, accounts for Forster's severe criticism of James—of the alleged lack of ' life ' in James's fiction.

Forster's charge that " a great deal of life has to disappear before James can do us a novel " does not seem to be quite fair, though the term ' life ' is not easy to pin down in words. This calls for a reference to James's essay on *The Art of Fiction*, 1884. He writes:

> The only reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to represent life...the only classification of the novel that I can understand is into that which has life and that which has it not.[26]

Forster finds James's presentation wanting in spontaneity and a sense of immediacy of sense-stimuli, and this attitude is at the root of his repudiation of James.

Forster devalues the achievement of James by presenting an indictment which is indeed very odd. He thinks that James's characters—

> —are incapable of fun, of rapid motion, of carnality, and of nine-tenths of heroism. Their clothes will not take off, the diseases that ravage them are anonymous, like the sources of their income, their servants are noiseless or resemble themselves, no social explanation of the world we know is possible for them, for there are no stupid people in their world, no barriers of language, and no poor. Even their sensations are limited.[27]

It seems to me that Forster's attacks are directed against James's later work only since the earlier work of James has a variety of interests which will dispel these charges. For

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(26) Henry James, *The Art of Fiction and Other Essays* (Oxford, 1948), p. 5.

(27) E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (London, 1927) p. 205.

instance, Hyacinth Robinson, the hero of *The Princess Casamassima*, 1856, is an illegitimate son of an aristocrat and also a 'revolutionary.' His mother had murdered her lover and was imprisoned. Hyacinth is brought up by a dressmaker. James describes the misery of the London poor faced with an extremely severe winter:

> ...for the season was terribly hard; and as, in that lower world, one walked with one's ear nearer the ground, the deep perpetual groan of London misery seemed to swell and swell, and form the whole undertone of life.[28]

Surely the charge that "no social explanation of the world we know is possible for them, for there are no stupid people in their world, no barriers of language and no poor" is untenable in relation to the early work of James. Hyacinth's poor co-worker asks: "What the plague am I to do with seventeen shillings?" Henry James revised this sentence in 1886 for the collected edition: "What the hell am I to do with half a quid?... And what the plague am I to do with seventeen bob—with seventeen bloody bob?"[29] James does reveal the barriers of language.

The major count against James, it appears, is the want of 'carnality' in his men and women. Forster believes that James's characters are too refined to be 'real'... "Their clothes will not take off..." This charge is perhaps justifiable, to a certain extent, in relation to the later work of James. But James's early work will belie Forster's argument. Forster's repudiation of James is obviously not based on the content or the subject-matter or the theme but the manner of expounding the theme. James deals with the theme of adultery, yet his descriptions of the scenes of sexual passion are much too restrained to give us a glimpse of reality. The physical element in James's work is almost 'bloodless.' This is partly true of James's later phase—the phase that produced the three great novels: *The Wings of the Dove*, 1902; *The Ambassadors*, 1903; *The Golden Bowl*, 1904. But James's rejection of carnality in the novels of his 'Full Prime' is a deliberate, conscious endeavour to maintain the integrity of his art. Henry James's *Notebooks* clearly reveal this attitude in relation to the portrayal of Millie, the heroine of *The Wings of the Dove*.

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(28) Henry James, *The Princess Casamassima* (London, 1886), p. 170.

(29) *The Atlantic Monthly*, Boston, February 1886, p. 170.

> It seems to me that one must represent her as too ill for *that* particular case. . .[30]

Millie, the ' Dove,' and her relationship with ' the young man ' is purposely shown to be devoid of carnality.

James's early novels, specially *The Portrait of a Lady*, 1881, depict scenes of love-making which are real and passionate. The early work, it seems to me, dispels Forster's charge of ' lack of carnality.' Isabel rejects Casper Goodwood and prepares to return to her husband's home in Rome. Casper arrives to meet Isabel in the garden and requests her to accept him even at that late stage. James does not show more than the necessary reserve in portraying this scene:

> He glared at her a moment through the dusk, and the next instant she felt his arms about her, and his lips on her own lips. His kiss was like a flash of lightning; when it was dark again she was free. She never looked about her; she only darted away from the spot.[31]

James rewrote this scene for the collected Edition. The revision will further belie Forster's charge:

> . . .His kiss was like white lightning, a flash that spread, and spread again, and stayed; and it was extraordinarily as if, while she took it, she felt each thing in his hard manhood that had least pleased her, each aggressive fact of his face, his figure, his presence, justified of its intense identity and made one with this act of possession. So had she heard of those wrecked and under water following a train of images before they sink. But when darkness returned she was free.[32]

The weakness which Forster finds in James is actually the failing of Forster himself. Surely the love scenes in Forster's novels are characterised by an odd bloodlessness, an ivorine chillness. Forster idealises his love scenes and they move a great deal away from carnality.

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(30) Henry James: *The Notebooks* (Edited: Matthiessen and Murdock. 1947, p. 169).

(31) Henry James, *The Portrait of a Lady* (New York, 1881), p. 413.

(32) *The Portrait of a Lady*, 1881 (Modern Library, New York, 1951), p. 436.

Rickie Elliot observes Gerald and Agnes 'locked in each other's arms';

> He only looked for a moment, but the sight burnt into his brain. The man's grip was the stronger. He had drawn the woman on to his knee, was pressing her, with all his strength, against him. Already her hands slipped off him, and she whispered, "Don't —you hurt—" Her face had no expression. It stared at the intruder and never saw him. Then her lover kissed it, and immediately it shone with mysterious beauty, like some star.[33]

This is a highly idealised love scene and remote from carnality.

Helen Schlegel finds the whole Wilcox family "a fraud" because she saw Paul Wilcox "mad with terror." Paul kisses Helen but the event is devoid of carnality. One will certainly endorse Forster's view that "by collisions of this trivial sort the doors of heaven may be shaken open."[34] But there is an odd inadequacy which holds us down. We find Mr. Beebe, for rather 'profound' reasons, "inwardly cursing the female sex."[35] The whole Wilcox tribe is deficient in sexuality. Cecil Vyse is likened to a Greek statue—handsome but inwardly cold. Nor is George Emerson a full-blooded young man. Forster's men and women, it seems to me, suffer from a woeful lack of carnality and sexuality. Therefore it seems odd that Forster should charge Henry James with want of carnality—a weakness which betrays Forster's own men and women.

In fact the lack of carnality is the common ground shared by Forster and the later James. It strengthens the evidence in support of James's impact on Forster.

To sum up, Forster's relationship with the tradition of the English novel with special reference to Henry James reveals a duality in his attitudes to the Master. Forster devalues the achievement of Henry James. Yet in the process of denouncing him, Forster, unwittingly perhaps, follows in the master's footsteps. The nature and scope

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(33) E. M. Forster, *The Longest Journey* (Pocket Edition), (London, 1907), p. 49.

(34) E. M. Forster, *Howards End* (London, 1910), (Pocket Edition), p. 26.

(35) E. M. Forster, *A Room With a View* (Pocket Edition), (London, 1908), p. 19.

of James's impact on Forster should be assessed against the background of the most individualistic elements of the master's contribution to the tradition of the English novel. James's novels, like Forster's, are studies in contrasted cultural relations. James's dramatic rendering of the "International Situation" influences Forster in a variety of ways. Points of agreement as well as disagreement between Forster and the master strengthen the evidence in support of the imperceptible manner in which one is influenced by the other. Forster's charge-sheet against James is almost untenable in relation to the master's early work. Though these charges seem to be substantial in relation to the later work of Henry James, they lose all their pungency and sharpness in view of the master's conscious endeavour towards developing certain patterns of individual and social life and related moral attitudes. Carnality is not a casualty in the early work of James. Forster does not seem to appreciate the reasons behind the want of carnality in James's later work. Forster repudiates James, and in doing so, is imperceptibly influenced by him. Forster's denunciation of Henry James becomes, therefore, a study in ambivalence.

JOYCE AND BERGSON'S 'MÉMOIRE PURE'

BY

SHIV K. KUMAR

EXCEPT *Dubliners*, each one of Joyce's works is, in a sense "a retrospective arrangement" (to borrow his own phrase) of his past experience, a quest, like Proust's, after the essence of time. Whereas *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses* treat time as *durée réelle*, as a process of ceaseless interpenetration of past, present and future, *Finnegans Wake* attempts to present the entire historical consciousness of man.

Memory forms in the work of Joyce, as of Proust, the essential basis of art. Proust, remarks Wyndham Lewis, "*returned* to the *temps perdu*. Joyce never left it. He discharged it as freshly as though the time he wrote about were present, because it was *his* present."[1]

Joyce is primarily engaged in an effort to relive his past away from the locale and recreate it in a medium that may be termed *la durée*. In an attempt to recapture the past through his characters, Joyce only affirms the continuity of all experience. Young Dedalus notes in his diary of April 6 that "the past is consumed in the present and the present is living only because it brings forth the future."[2]

To grasp fully the impulse behind Joyce's art of characterisation, therefore, the reader must immerse himself in the character's stream of consciousness to realize the slow process of becoming in which he is perpetually involved. The past, in a typical Bergsonian sense, has no separate identity as such; it forms an organic part of the ever-swelling *durée*. The present, therefore, if we could at all segregate time into mechanical divisions, is constantly growing into larger dimensions in a process of ceaseless change and renewal. This explains Stephen's reaction to Bloom's "unfamiliar melody" (in the Ithaca episode) in which he hears "the accumulation of the past."[3]

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(1) Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man* (London, 1927), p. 109. Lewis asserts that even Bloom and his wife are aspects of Joyce's own personality.

(2) James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (London, 1950), p. 286.

(3) James Joyce, *Ulysses* (London, 1949), p. 650.

Each of his characters lives in a twilight zone of past association and immediate perception, particularly in moments of heightened sensibility when the mind (remarks Stephen Dedalus) " is a fading coal, that which I was is that which I am and that which in possibility I may come to be."[4]

Stephen and Bloom live under a perpetual shadow of the past; they are paragons of memory. " My memory's not so bad,"[5] says Bloom, and so could Stephen Dedalus and Molly Bloom justly pride themselves on their vivid remembrances of things past. They do not go, like Proust's Marcel, in search of lost time: memory is co-extensive with their perceptions, manifesting itself in a thousand elusive forms. It may, in fact, be said that *memoire involontaire* or Bergson's *mémoire pure* is a permanent aspect of their mental processes, and it is rarely that they have to evoke past images by a deliberate effort of the will. When Stephen Dedalus, under a somewhat embarrassing thrust from his rival Heron, begins to recite the *Confiteor*, he hears both Heron and Wallis breaking into laughter:

" The confession came only from Stephen's lips and, while they spoke the words, *a sudden memory had carried him to another scene called up, as if by magic*, at the moment when he had noted the faint cruel dimples at the corners of Heron's smiling lips and had felt the familiar stroke of the cane against his calf. . . "[6]

These " magical " recurrences of past images are, in fact, a permanent feature of the stream of consciousness method as employed by Joyce. These recollections come in parts, as disconnected images, half-remembered words and phrases, and float along the stream of thought.

" Stream of life. What was the name of that priesty-looking chap was always squinting in when he passed? Weak eyes, woman. Stopped in Citron's saint Kevin's parade. Pen. . . something. . . Of course it's years ago. Noise of the trams probably. . . "[7]

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(4) *Ibid.*, p. 183.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 361.

(6) *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, p. 88 (Italics mine).

(7) *Ulysses*, p. 144.

In order to represent the ceaseless flow of involuntary memory, Joyce often presents past images in a strangely jumbled form. Bloom's " retrospective arrangements," for instance, are invariably of this nature:

" Bloowho went by Moulang's pipes, bearing in his breast the sweets of sin, by Wine's antiques in memory bearing sweet sinful words, by Carroll's dusky battered plate, for Roul."[8]

And again, while walking on the beach, Bloom falls into a similar reminiscent mood: " O sweety all your little girlwhite up I saw dirty bracegirdle made me do love sticky we two naughty Grace darling she him half past the bed met him pike hoses frillies for Raoul to perfume your wife black hair...dreams return tail end Agendath swoony lovey showed me her next year in drawers return next in her next her next."[9]

It is not difficult to trace in these extracts overtones from Leopold Bloom's experiences earlier in the day and his preoccupations with thoughts of his wife's lovers and the nostalgic memories of his deceased son. These memories rise and fall, uncontrolled by any conscious will, and are therefore flashes of *mémoire pure* which records, according to Bergson, " in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time; it neglects no detail; it leaves to each fact, to each gesture, its place and date."[10] The following passage from *Ulysses* will show how Bloom's mind retains a vivid recollection of his past experiences in all their original detail:

" Windy night that was I went to fetch her there was that lodge meeting on about those lottery tickets after Godwin's concert... He and I behind. Sheet of her music blew out of my hand against the high school railings... Remember her laughing at the wind, her blizzard collar up ...Remember when we got home raking up the fire and frying up those pieces of lap mutton for her supper with the Chutney sauce she liked. And the mulled rum. Could see her in the bedroom from the hearth unclamping the busk of her stays. White.

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(8) *Ibid.*, p. 244.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 365.

(10) Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (London, 1911), p. 92.

" Swish and soft flop her stays made on the bed... Sitting there after till near two, taking out her hairpins."[11]

It is interesting to note how Bloom's mind has been able to retain across many years such minor details as the " pieces of lap of mutton," " the mulled rum," the " swish and soft flop " of his wife's stays.

Joyce's next concern is to suggest the source of these involuntary recollections and in this respect he again presents a Bergsonian view of memory. This problem occupies Stephen Dedalus' mind during his rambles at Clongowes in the company of his father:

" His monstrous reveries came thronging into his memory. They too had sprung up before him, suddenly and furiously, out of mere words. He had soon given in to them and allowed them to sweep across and abase his intellect, *wondering always where they came from, from what den of monstrous images*..."[12]

This den whence issue these " monstrous reveries " is, as already suggested, Bergson's " pure memory " which registers alongside of each other all events in their original order of sequence. From this reservoir emerge, voluntarily or involuntarily, depending upon the state of our mental tension at a particular moment, past images in response to stimuli from our immediate environments.

Joyce's treatment of memory is as significant as Proust's, though not as comprehensive. He is impelled by a similar urge to recognise the importance of involuntary memory in prose-fiction. The most significant passage on memory occurs in *Ulysses* where Mrs. Mina Purefoy, the wife of " the conscientious second accountant of the Ulster bank," is lying in child-bed and recalls " across the mist of years " memories of her smooth marital relations with her husband, " *memories*[13] which are hidden away by man in the darkest places of the heart but they *abide there and wait.* He may suffer their memory to grow dim, let them be as though they had not been and all but persuade himself that they were not or at least were otherwise. *Yet a chance word will call them forth*

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(11) *Ulysses*, p. 145.

(12) *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, etc., p. 102. (Italics mine).

(13) Although the first part of this passage is concerned primarily with " evil memories," it also represents adequately Joyce's general theory of memory.

suddenly and they will rise up to confront him in the most various circumstances, a vision or a dream... A scene disengages itself in the observer's memory, evoked, it would seem, by a word of so natural a homeliness as if those days were really present there (as some thought) with their immediate pleasures. A shaven space of lawn one soft May evening, the well-remembered grove of lilacs at Roundtown, purple and white, fragrant slender spectators of the game but with much real interest in the pellets as they run slowly forward over the sward or collide and stop, one by its fellow, with a brief alert shock."[14]

In tone and presentation, this passage may recall Bergson's theory of memory, or Proust's treatment of *mémoire involontaire* in *A la recherche du temps perdu*.[15] Not only does this passage provide a comprehensive answer to Stephen's query in regard to the nature and origin of memories but it also supplies a significant clue to the understanding of much of the work of James Joyce. The passage opens with an affirmation of the indestructibility of the past, of the dictum that memories may lie dormant in the unconscious but they only " abide there and wait." This eternal existence of our past is one of he fundamental tenets of Bergson's conception of " pure memory " as, according to him, each moment is characterised by " a persistence of the past in the present."[16]

In the second half of the passage Joyce proceeds further to illustrate his theory of memory by showing how a single chance word, scene or object, may evoke in us a past experience which otherwise might seem to have faded into complete oblivion. Memory, therefore, for both Joyce and Proust, is fundamental to the understanding of the true nature of human experience: it is synonymous with duration in which the self is constantly growing into new forms in a process of creative evolution. Stephen Dedalus appears to represent this Bergsonian view of experience when he describes his ceaseless metamorphosis into new selves:

" Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound.

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(14) *Ulysses*, p. 403. (Italics mine).

(15) Also compare with Dorothy Richardson's treatment of memory in *Pilgrimage*, Vol. 4 (London, 1938), p. 368.

(16) Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London, 1911), p. 20.

Buzz. Buzz.

But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I *by memory because under everchanging forms*. . ."[17]

One may not agree with Wyndham Lewis's assertion that the " powerful impressionism of *Ulysses*, " and " the mental method " employed by Joyce date " from the publication of *Matière et Mémoire*."[18] Yet there exists a marked parallelism in view of the close resemblance between Joyce's treatment of memory and Bergson's. Interpreted in terms of Bergson's *mémoire pure*, much of the work of Joyce acquires a new coherence and significance.

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(17) *Ulysses*, p. 178. (Italics mine).

(18) Wyndham Lewis, *Time and Western Man* (London, 1927), p. 132.

A CRITIQUE OF PARADISE LOST, by John Peter. Columbia University Press, New York; Longmans, London; available in India from Orient Longmans, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Hyderabad; 25 Shillings; pp. 172.

DURING the last decade or so, Milton seems to have attracted a great deal of critical attention. Although commentators like Milton French (*The Life Records of John Milton*), D. C. Allen (*The Harmonious Vision*), H. F. Fletcher (*The Intellectual Development of John Milton*) Svendsen (*Milton and Science*), James Whaler (*Counter-point and Symbol*), E. H. Visiak (*The Potent of Milton*), to mention only criticism published since 1954, have all attempted to inquire into the possibilities of interpreting Milton's work from different *points de vue*, the tone has invariably been adulatory and not critically objective. John Peter may, therefore, be considered one of those few critics who have boldly and discriminately probed into Milton's *Paradise Lost* with a view to stressing its innumerable inconsistencies and aesthetic lapses. In adopting this attitude he may have been influenced by Waldock (*Paradise Lost and Its Critics*), but the *Critique*, it must be conceded, remains fundamentally a highly scholarly and fresh approach to the subject.

Basing his argument on a close examination of *Paradise Lost*, John Peter shows how Milton's portrayal of such supramundane characters as God, Satan, and the angels, lacks the conviction of verisimilitude. Milton's God does not seem to be without a palpable trace of "hypocrisy." If one doesn't read the text "indulgently and unreflectively" one must endorse the author's observation that the God of *Paradise Lost* is a "heterogeneous complex of ingredients, part man, part spirit, part attested biblical Presence, part dogma." One cannot help thinking that a poet of Milton's stature might have made some attempt to synthesize these "irreconcilables" into a plausible pattern.

Even Milton's treatment of the Son remains rather unsatisfactory. The language applied to him often becomes poetically inadequate, or even "nonsensical," as in the lines:

> Son in whose face invisible is beheld
> Visibly, what by Deitie I am (vi. 681-2).

Milton's Satan, often supposed to be his own counterpart, also fails to create any genuine impact on the reader's mind, because he functions in an essentially false situation. "On the one hand Hell has to be a terrifying prison, fiery and turbulent; on the other, Satan's first speech must ring imperiously and boldly if it is to sound the keynote of his scale. Neither requirement offers much difficulty in itself, but when they are *carelessly* associated they *contradict* each other: Satan's composure makes the flames of Hell seem tepid, while the flames make his composure seem absurd." If a similar fallacy (of hunting for an immediate effect at each point as it offers) has been rightly deplored in the plays of Beaumont and Fletcher, why shouldn't Milton's indiscretions be also exposed?

The only characters that appear to us genuinely conceived and successfully delineated are Adam and Eve. One does agree with John Peter that their peculiar charm lies in their sexuality "that is quite untainted, pure and immaculate," whereas the sexual relationship between Satan and Sin is "secret" (*P.L.*, ii, 766), furtive and unsavoury. But when the author presents this innocent and uninhibited relationship between Adam and Eve in terms of D. H. Lawrence's handling of the relationship between Lady Chatterley and her lover, one feels that he has overplayed his hand, because *Paradise Lost* does *not* "offer a similar reminder."

In the *Epilogue* John Peter attempts to justify his critical attitude towards *Paradise Lost*, not because it may be more exciting to pull a great writer to pieces, but to plead for a more objective assessment (and specially to discourage the traditional tendency to present even Milton's faults as "occult successes"). "In criticism," observes the author, "as in law, one's standard must be the standard of a reasonable man, not an inquisitor or a bigot," or an unqualified apologist. This *Critique*, in brief, seems to amplify in greater detail Professor Knight's pertinent criticism of *Paradise Lost* "that it is not deeply felt. The inflexible movement, the formal epithets, the often inappropriate imagery betray the lack of that essential quality that Wordsworth called 'organic sensibility.'"

John Peter's *Critique of Paradise Lost* is undoubtedly a major contribution to Miltonic criticism; every serious student of Milton should regard this *Critique* as a useful corrective to the disproportionately indulgent and irresponsible criticism that has often been written about this "great epic."

THE CONSECRATED URN, by Bernard Blackstone. Longmans, Green and Co., London: available in India from Orient Longmans, Madras, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Hyderabad; 45 Shillings; pp. 426.

KEATS is another poet whose work has undergone revaluation during recent years. Since Thorpe first attempted to rehabilitate Keats more as a profound thinker than as a mere sensuous poet (*The Mind of Keats*), his potentialities as a philosopher have been elaborately explored by many contemporary critics. But whereas Gittings has chosen to explore only the sources of Keats's inspiration (*The Mask of Keats*), and Pettet has concerned himself mostly with his imagery (with a feeble attempt to restore him more as the poet of " sensations rather than thoughts,") Bernard Blackstone undertakes in this book to relate his poetry to the philosophic trends of his times.

In this commentary Keats emerges as a sensitive mind responding critically to the shifts of emphasis in the intellectual climate of the early nineteenth century. Bernard Blackstone is undoubtedly the first critic to suggest a palpable relationship between Keats's earlier training as a surgeon and his poetic theory. Consequently, he attempts to revaluate his poetry as an *organism*, embodying in highly suggestive symbols the themes of birth, growth and decay (*Ode to Autumn*). Even if Professor Blackstone occasionally overemphasizes the correspondence between Keats and Erasmus Darwin, an earlier doctor-poet, he certainly succeeds in indicating Keats's preoccupations with concepts of physiological growth and structures.

The author further shows, through judiciously documented internal and external evidence, that Keats, like his contemporaries Coleridge and Blake, was keenly alive to the contemporary problems of psychology and metaphysics; in fact, he also developed an interest in the occult sciences. It is, however, doubtful as to how much he owed to his brief visit to Oxford, in September 1817, when under the influence of Bailey he is supposed to have developed a Platonic attitude towards life. " There is no direct evidence that Keats read Plato," he admits, but he considers " the indirect evidence... overwhelming." In the chapter " Heaven's Airy Dome," he gives innumerable internal references, most of which remain rather inconclusive. In fact, one must remember that a critic like Bernard Blackstone, so deeply immersed in philosophic thought, may inevitably succumb to the temptation of forcing Keats's poetry into a preconceived philosophic

framework—a tendency clearly discernible in his earlier commentaries on Blake and Virginia Woolf.

However, making a few allowances for his philosophic predilections, Bernard Blackstone's assessment of Keats must remain one of the most scholarly books ever written on this subject. His range of reference is indeed amazing, his perception to read new meanings in familiar passages remarkable. The chapter on the Odes is, however, the most commendable part of this book. The author attempts to interpret these poems in terms of *gestalt* psychology. The odes, he observes, can be understood " by returning to our initial concept of areas in space and time in which manifestations come into being through cosmic processes "; these odes should be considered essentially " as a choral whole, the themes of which are firmly stated in the first movement."

In fact, there is hardly any chapter that does not suggest new critical insights into Keats's mind and poetry. *The Consecrated Urn* should indeed be received as a significant contribution to the study of Keats.

THE NOVEL AND THE MODERN WORLD, by David Daiches. The University of Chicago Press; $ 5.00; pp. 217.

This is a revised edition of the book that Dr. Daiches published some twenty years ago. But in spite of its " youth and rashness," (to quote his words from the preface), this book has been acknowledged as one of the most distinguished valuations of contemporary fiction (perhaps the only other critic one can think of in this context is Professor J. W. Beach whose book *The Twentieth Century Novel*, because of its preoccupation with problems of technique, remains only a partial commentary on the modern novel).

Dr. Daiches has introduced many significant changes in this edition: he has dropped the chapters on Galsworthy, Katherine Mansfield and Aldous Huxley, has written an entirely new chapter on Conrad, and has added a sensitive analysis of the mind and work of D. H. Lawrence, with whom " he could not come to terms " earlier. The book, therefore, in its new dress, is almost a fresh valuation of the aesthetic, technical and sociological problems confronting the contemporary novelist.

It is never easy to place a critic like Daiches into any formal category, for, in spite of his apparent sociological bias (one of his main concerns has always been the relationship between fiction and civilisation), he is unmistakably synthetic in his critical approaches. He is as much concerned with problems of technique (the classic example being his chapter on Virginia Woolf, in which he discusses in detail the technique of stream of consciousness as employed by her), as with sex, paradoxes of human values, or the new awareness of time and consciousness. In fact, through his discussion of the four representative novelists of this century, he indicates the peculiar responses of the contemporary mind to the complex challenges of our time. The greatest dilemma in contemporary fiction, according to Dr. Daiches, is the absence of " any community of belief " or " public truth." In one form or another, all novelists, after the First World War, began to cultivate individual consciousness. This obsessive preoccupation with self, in the face of growing disintegration of values, manifested its creative urges in an increasing concern with experimentation in technique. In a society, devoid of any stable moral or ethical code, the novelist became so much wrapped up in his private world that even his symbols lost all their universal significance. " Every man becomes the prisoner of his own private consciousness, his unique train of association, which results in turn from his own unique past. The public gestures he makes toward communication can never be more than approximate, and he can never rely on their being understood.....Society is thus in a sense unreal; its institutions inevitably blunt and coarsen the truth about the individual self, providing means of communication that can only distort. Loneliness is seen as the necessary condition of man." To a great extent this would remain an almost definitive assessment of the human predicament today.

It is certain that in its revised form *The Novel and the Modern World* would be considered one of the most authentic studies of modern fiction, and it may not be easy for any other critic to improve upon the lucidity, incisiveness, depth and suave urbanity of this masterly exposition.

STUDIES IN HUMAN TIME, by Georges Poulet (tr. Elliott Coleman). The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 18, Md; $ 5.00; pp. 363.

STUDIES IN HUMAN TIME, originally published in France as *Études sur le temps humain*, is perhaps the most comprehensive

survey of the problem of time in philosophy and literature. No wonder, it was awarded the Prix Saint-Beuve, the Duchon Prize, and the Grand Prize of the Syndicate of Critics in Paris.

The emergence of time as a new mode of perception in contemporary criticism is comparatively a recent phenomenon. There have been so far two important studies of time in literature, by Hans Meyerhoff (*Time in Literature*) and A. A. Mendilow (*Time and the Novel*), besides a few casual and fragmentary articles in various scholarly journals. But none of these commentaries has achieved the scholarly thoroughness of Georges Poulet, who must therefore remain the most outstanding time-critic of today.

Being a European, Georges Poulet, discusses the concept of time with special reference to the continental thinkers and writers; it was only in the English edition that he added an appendix on "Time and American writers," to include comments on Emerson, Hawthorne, Poe, Thoreau, Melville, Whitman, Emily Dickinson, Henry James and T. S. Eliot.

Till the end of the nineteenth century time was hardly recognised as a significant aspect of aesthetic experience. It often intruded into a work of art as an elusive abstraction, of hardly any import to a poet, novelist or dramatist. It was only in the first quarter of this century that it emerged as a fundamental principle of artistic creation. Poulet might have referred to Italo Svevo, that half-forgotten novelist from Italy, whose work derives a new poignancy because of its sensitive discrimination between chronological time and *la durée*. Virginia Woolf, another writer ignored by Poulet, was one of the first British novelists to invite a critical investigation into "the discrepancy between time on the clock and time in the mind" (*Orlando*, p. 91). This problem, she remarks, "deserves fuller investigation."

Georges Poulet's book is an elaborate exposition of this abstruse problem, which has baffled many a critic and philosopher. After tracing the history of the concept of time from the middle ages down to the present day, he undertakes to analyse its importance in the work of Montaigne (according to whom "life is only motion, an irregular, perpetual motion, without pattern and without aim), Descartes, Pascal, Moliere (whose plays embody, in a certain sense, "a precarious, spasmodic duration"), Racine, Fontenelle, Rousseau (who observes that "everything upon earth is in continuous flux"),

Flaubert (with whom the problem of time is simply a problem of style), Beaudelaire and others.

It is, however, only in the novels of Proust that time acquires a new pungency and relevance. Memory, according to him, plays the same supernatural role as grace in Christian thought—*souvenir involontaire* thus becomes a form of mystical realization of reality. Poulet, however, fails to suggest a correspondence between Proustian time and Bergsonian *durée* (surprisingly enough there is not even a single reference to Bergson in the chapter on Proust), especially because *Le Temps Retrouvé* is, in many respects, a faithful rendering of *la durée créatrice*. One also wishes that the author had explored, in further detail, the potentialities of time-memory-consciousness in the plays and poetry of T. S. Eliot, whose work responds to a multitude of diverse influences from Heraclitus to Bergson (incidentally, Eliot was Bergson's pupil at the Sorbonne during 1910-12).

But if *Studies in Human Time* raises further expectations of this kind, it is because Poulet seems to be the only philosopher-critic who could interpret for us human time, in its multiversant aspects, in the creative endeavour of our epoch.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM, by Louis Fraiberg. Wayne University Press; Detroit; $ 5.95; pp. 263.

A PSYCHOANALYTICAL approach to literary problems is often viewed with distrust and misgivings. It is remarked that psychoanalysis is inherently inadequate to interpret any imaginative reconstruction of human experience.

But this is obviously a fallacious point of view, since psychoanalysis, as applied to literary criticism, has become in recent years a very fruitful field of critical enquiry. Freud, Jung and Adler have undoubtedly opened new avenues of literary valuation.

Unlike Professor Hoffman (*Freudianism and the Literary Mind*), Fraiberg is not concerned with a psychoanalytical assessment of novelists and poets. He has attempted in this book to apply Freudian psychology to an important school of literary criticism, which has such well-known exponents as Ernest Jones, Hanns Sachs, Van Wyck Brooks, Joseph Wood Krutch, Edmund Wilson, Kenneth Burke and Lionel Trilling.

Although many a contemporary critic has made an occasional reference to the Freudian theory of art, very few have cared to ascertain the veracity of views often attributed to this psychologist. Consequently, Freudian psychology, as understood by many, appears to be a curious medley of contradictions and discrepancies. Fraiberg has, therefore, done the cause of " Psychoanalytical Criticism " great service by rendering an exhaustive exposition of the Freudian theory of literary valuation. The author combines in himself the sensitivity of a literary critic with the rigorous discipline and precision of a psychoanalyst.

There is, however, one minor shortcoming in this book: it is mostly concerned with offering a justification of the Freudian system of thought, with only spasmodic references to Jung or Adler, and with hardly any tangible effort to bring out the limitations of a psychoanalytic approach. For instance, how far could one accept Dr. Jones's ingenious explanation of the Hamnet-Hamlet-Shakespeare problem? And is there enough evidence to show that " Shakespeare emerged from the Oedipal situation in childhood with a greater accentuation of his feminine tendencies ?", or, that " he had a strong latent homosexuality which caused him great suffering " (p. 54). Obviously a psychoanalytic approach, carried beyond legitimate limits, is most likely to lapse into ostensible fallacies and misconceptions.

Perhaps the most balanced of all these psychoanalytic critics is Lionel Trilling, who applies this method with judicious discrimination. In his famous essay " Art and Neurosis," he shows the fallacy of equating art with mental illness:

> " The artist is . . . unique in one respect, in the respect of his relation to his neurosis. He is by virtue of his successful objectification of his neurosis . . . his genius can no more be defined in terms of neurosis than can his power of walking and talking, or his sexuality."

But applied with proper care and discrimination, a psychoanalytic method of critical valuation can undoubtedly " illuminate literature." It is a form of scientific discipline, based on a body of facts, which can lead to a clearer perception of many complex literary problems. Professor Fraiberg concludes that " a creative criticism will take from psychoanalysis what it has to offer and use it within the larger context. The values of the critic can hardly be compromised if they take into account the little that science can tell us about the truth."

ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1700-1740, by Bonamy Dobree. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, available in India from Oxford University Press, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta; 42 Shillings, pp. 701.

THE eighteenth century literature has come to acquire a peculiar relevance for our age, in view of the pronounced 'neo-classical' tone of contemporary criticism, poetry, prose and drama. One may hear overtones of Eliot's voice in the following verses of Heath-Stubbs (who makes the ageing Congreve address Mrs. Bracegirdle thus):

> And now we live in a rounded time, rounded
> With a low horizon of feeling, until men break it.
> We have forgotten the old high modes of loving
> And the song's poise is gone.

With the exception of a brief interlude of vitalism in contemporary philosophy, the main trend of philosophic thought today, with its accent on logical positivism, should also recall the philosophers of the early eighteenth century. Professor Dobree's survey of the literature of this period should, therefore, bring many of the contemporary literary and philosophical ideas into sharper focus.

As one of the general editors of the *Oxford History of English Literature*, Professor Dobree has been responsible for laying down the pattern of this new history. This volume carries all the usual features—a complete historical, social, political and philosophical background, studies of individual writers, together with a chronological table and a comprehensive bibliography of the textual and critical material available on this period.

Yet Professor Dobree's treatment of the subject has many unique features. He is less concerned with "the sleuth-hound of trends and influences," still less interested in over-simplifying the fundamental urges of this period in ingeniously conceived generalisations. An arbitrary statement, he believes, unsupported by any tangible evidence, is a mark of arrogance in a critic, and Dobree is too well known for his intellectual modesty, concreteness of approach, uncompromising integrity and an amazing range of reference—a combination of qualities that has made him the doyen of contemporary critics.

Unlike many other critics, he does not try to forge into a convenient harmony all the diverse, often contradictory, attitudes of this period. On the contrary, he prefers to confront all such antinomies boldly and realistically. " Often quite contradictory sets of assumptions co-exist, not only in the same society but in the same person." He, therefore, distrusts the use of such anaemic, and often misleading, phrases as the " age of reason "—" such explanations will not serve."

Although the accent in this book is on the distinct characteristics of the early eighteenth century literature, individual studies of Pope, Swift, Defoe and others, must claim a special mention here. Pope, observes Dobree, cannot be understood " unless in reading him we rid ourselves of the coxcombry of our perpetual moral pretensions. He exists, he is a quality; he continually gives us an addition to life, a delight which releases in us springs of understanding." (p. 188).

About *Gulliver's Travels*, he admits that it " is a terrible book, perhaps a ruthless book, but it is not a horrible one. It is true that it does not flatter man; it is not optimistic; it contains no Christian comfort, and it leaves us conscious of having ' too much weakness for the Stoic's pride '; *but it is, in essence, a challenge.* It is not a gloomy, or despairing, or blasphemous book, and it teaches at least that half of Stoicism which tells us that:

> . . . unless he can,
> Above himself erect himself, how poor a thing is man."

In fact, Dobree's revaluation of Swift presents this " prince amongst cynics " in mellower tones, as a writer not utterly devoid of an innate love of mankind. " Brutal Swift could be, but his brutality has been exaggerated; delicate he could be; the humanity of his feeling cannot be exaggerated." (p. 473).

Defoe, the ' miscellaneous writer,' also emerges from these pages in a new light. In spite of his cumbersome moralizings, his frequent use of circumstantial details, he was certainly one of the most accomplished writers of his age. He had " a sense of the sound of words, and a *cursus*-like effect," a marked architectonic sense about his sentence-structures. As a pioneer of English fiction, he carried the narrative technique to an unprecedented degree, and " established the realistic novel, and gave a pointer to the psychological brand."

But isolated excerpts from this book can hardly do any justice to its *organic* treatment of one of the most controversial eras in English literary history. " The most sustained labour of his life " must also remain Professor Dobree's most crowning achievement so far as a critic, and perhaps the most successful volume so far published in the *Oxford History of English Literature.*

S. K. KUMAR

SHAKESPEARE AND THE CRAFT OF TRAGEDY, by William Rosen. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, pp. 231, Price $ 4.75.

ONE more proof—if proof be needed—of the scholarly work that is being done in the field of English Studies by the American Universities, is the recent publication of Mr. William Rosen's *Shakespeare and the Craft of Tragedy.*

There is always room in any library of Shakespeare for a volume of sober personal evaluation of the plays based on a close study of the texts themselves, irrespective of the views of established critics. Mr. Rosen makes such an effort and with no pretensions. He modestly declares, " This study of the last four major tragedies does not attempt to establish a revolutionary method that will set misguided thinking aright." His aim is limited and realistic, *viz.*, the objective understanding of the central character in a play. This book concerns itself primarily with the exposition of the character of the heroes of *King Lear*, *Macbeth*, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *Coriolanus.*

The choice of the four plays is significant. There is an opposition of two of the most powerful tragedies of Shakespeare to two others of inferior merit; for despite the magnificent texture of poetry and the baffling witchcraft of the Serpent of the Nile, *Antony and Cleopatra* is admittedly inferior to the greatest tragedies of Shakespeare. More important still, while there is a large measure of rapport between the audience and the hero in *King Lear* and *Macbeth*, it is absent in the two Roman Plays. There is no involvement of the audience in the action, accounting for the comparative ineffectiveness of the Roman Tragedies.

The character studies of King Lear and Macbeth are ably done. Both of them pass through a process of stripping and evolve into two utterly dissimilar personalities. The

imperious old king, accustomed to flattery and obedience is progressively shorn of majesty and power, of filial affection and gratitude. The tearing of his clothes by Lear in the storm scene is merely an externalization of a process that has been continually at work. After exposing himself to the " pelting of this pitiless storm " " to feel what wretches feel," Lear emerges a chastened figure from a self-centered world of pomp and power into an ampler world of humanity, with enlarged sympathy and a true perception of values.

Macbeth undergoes a similar process, but turns into evil incarnate, though not without a terrible inner conflict. Embarking upon an expedition of crime, he divests himself of every vestige of humanity and, in a desperate bid for survival, destroys every one who is a potential threat to his power.

In evaluating the personality of Macbeth, Mr. Rosen does not accept either of the generally held views that Macbeth is inherently wicked and that the prophecy of the witches is an articulate expression of his unholy ambition or that his loyalty is perverted into vaulting ambition by the illusory promise of the weird sisters. Mr. Rosen argues that in the early scenes " we have before us the image of a Macbeth, who is the noble deliverer of his nation. He has the potentialities of an ideal man." But then he was born into a chaotic world where it is difficult to distinguish between right and wrong, where " fair is foul and foul is fair." The prophecy of the third witch that " he will be king hereafter," so excites his imagination that he gets caught up in a course of action against which his better nature rebels and unnerves him. The element of efficiency and resolution is supplied by Lady Macbeth who compels him to murder King Duncan. The farrago of heinous crimes that Macbeth commits thereafter are forced upon him in sheer self-preservation. Hence, although one does not approve of the misdeeds of Macbeth, the usurper, there is sympathy for Macbeth, the man. His valour and natural noble impulses, his harrowing mental conflict, his bitter remorse and the feeling of utter isolation and weariness of spirit he feels at the end, are saving graces that enable him to hold his place as a tragic hero.

After balancing the praise and censure of critics, Mr. Rosen feels that Antony is unimpressive as a tragic hero, because of the absence of spiritual contact between him and the audience. Antony has a magnificent record of achievement, but it is merely reported and it belongs to the past. In Egypt the general is shown in a state of " dotage." On

the three occasions when he resolves to " break these strong Egyptian fetters," and rehabilitate himself as the ideal soldier, his efforts end in shame and disaster. " In confronting the world, Antony undergoes no change or development; no new possibilities are opened to him and through him to the community which is his audience." What is more, the audience sees and judges him through the eyes of other people—of Philo, Demetrius, Enobarbus and Octavius and does not enter into his mind or feelings.

Proud Coriolanus, obsessed with honour, is an unbending warrior who is incapable of fulfilling a role in peace time. Shakespeare reveals to the audience what happens to Coriolanus and not what happens within his mind. True tragic effect, which depends on a clash of opposing forces within, rather than on outer conflict between physical forces, is, therefore, lacking.

Mr. Rosen's occasional excursions into Dostoevsky, Herman Melville and Joseph Conrad for analogies to elucidate his points are refreshing and instructive.

In an endeavour to view character in the right perspective, the author has of necessity to consider some of the dramatic and technical devices employed by the playwright. That is the justification for the title *Shakespeare and the Craft of Tragedy*, which, at first sight has the effect of startling the reader into attention. Devices like the foreshadowing of character by minor *dramatis personae* which Mr. Rosen calls " prefiguration," an expression that loses much of its terror through familiarity and usage, the employment of unbiased commentators, *punctum indifferens*, like the fool in *Lear* and Enobarbus in *Antony and Cleopatra*, are pressed into service for his assessment. Juxtaposition of worlds of opposing values, as in *King Lear*, and Rome and Alexandria in *Antony and Cleopatra*, the use of sub-plot and parallelism, of pathetic fallacy and atmosphere, of image patterns and key-words, are judiciously examined as aids to exposition of character.

Without attempting to startle the reader, Mr. Rosen enables him persuasively to imbibe a wealth of observation and comment, and understand the utility of artifices and conventions of tragedy. We are grateful for a very readable, convincing, and well-documented exposition of a difficult problem.

J. S. SASTRI

RESTORATION LITERATURE, by K. M. P. Burton. Hutchinson University Library.

Miss Burton's book is an attempt, as the preface states, to shift critical emphasis from the comparatively ephemeral elements in Restoration comedy to the " more serious writings " of the age, so that a truer perspective may be gained. In her introductory chapter Miss Burton briefly examines the main features of this period—the expanding economy with its social implications, the growth of Science and the creed of ' Reason ' and common sense, the rise of materialism and scepticism, the gradual spreading of religious toleration, the acceptance, with reservations, in literary circles, of the neo-classical critical theory and the urbanization of London.

In the chapters that follow Miss Burton deals with the writers of the years from 1660 to 1700. Her book is intended to be an assessment of the intellectual activity of the period as a whole.

Miss Burton's critical method is conservative, based on an examination, in some detail, of the more important and representative works of the period. She devotes considerable space in her brief volume (226 pages of text) to an evaluation of the major Restoration satires and plays, and of such works as *The Pilgrim's Progress*, Traherne's *Centuries of Meditations*, Burnet's *The Sacred Theory of the Earth*, Clarendon's *Life* and Halifax's *Character of a Trimmer*. This evaluation is done in a familiar, lecture-room vocabulary and suffers from a text-bookish flatness of style. It is not Miss Burton's object, apparently, to say anything particularly provocative—her book is one of a series on English Literature being published under the general editorship of Prof. Basil Willey. She expresses views that have the sanction of general critical acceptance and her terminology is well defined. Occasionally, however, one may disagree with Miss Burton. It is difficult, for example, to support her when she rounds off an admirable summing up of the recent critical assessment of Restoration comedy with the remark, " Restoration drama as a whole has little literary value." This seems rather to overshoot the mark when we remember that not only have these plays received serious attention from scholars

but have continued to charm theatre-goers. With all its apparent sense of irresponsibility, Restoration comedy has a quality of wit and phrase that gives it a peculiar and lasting value of its own. Moreover, it has lived through Sheridan and Oscar Wilde to the present day.

There are two interesting chapters in the book on ' The Enthusiasts '—Bunyan, Traherne and Burnet—, and ' The Men of the World '—the Earl of Clarendon and the Marquis of Halifax. On Bunyan, Miss Burton is somewhat apologetic. Bunyan obviously belonged to a previous age. He fiercely defended an old order in the face of change, and he had no appreciation of the nature of that change. Traherne and Burnet, on the other hand, were trying to find a congenial footing for Christianity in a world of changing values. Traherne turned to nature and intuition (*Centuries of Meditations*), while Burnet tried to reconcile science and religion (*The Sacred Theory of the Earth*). Their prose in respect of its medieval logic and imaginative quality recalls Milton and Sir Thomas Browne on the one hand, and anticipates the authors of the Romantic Revival on the other. The passage quoted by Miss Burton, in which Traherne speaks of the world as it appeared to him in his childhood curiously foreshadows Wordsworth's Immortality Ode:

> " The dust and stones of the street were as precious as gold: The gates were at first the end of the world..... Eternity was manifest in the light of Day, and something infinite behind everything appeared: which talked with my expectation and moved my desire." Clarendon and Halifax were the apostles of common sense—which is reason at its sub-philosophic level—, the ' good sense ' that occupied such a high place in the scale of values until the Romantic revolt."

These two chapters and the next on the influence of Locke are meant to balance the picture of the age and to bring home the point that the epoch did not wholly belong to the creative authors alone. There is no quarrelling with this presentation, but what one would have desired in the book is a deeper and larger awareness of the undercurrents fertilising and interlinking works which are different on the surface. This can indeed be overdone and a period can be turned into a four-cornered room with the various works neatly hung up on the walls, each in its proper place. But, if not carried too far, such an approach is

essential for an intelligent appreciation of an age as well as of individual works. In this respect, one feels, Miss Burton's book is somewhat deficient. It does not fully establish the bearings and *rapporti* of the period. Its continental debts and affiliations, for example, are very inadequately noticed. Galileo and Borelli are mentioned as if they existed solely to enable Newton to frame his laws of motion, the merest mention is made of Boileau and Moliere, none at all of Lope de Vega and the Spanish intrigue play, of the literary baroque that culminated in Marino and Francesco Redi in Italy and, through Sir Thomas Browne and the metaphysical poets, was transmitted to the Restoration writers affecting their diction, of Ariosto and Tasso whom Dryden made models for the heroic play.

This is of course, not to detract from the value of a book which is written with considerable lucidity and judicious scholarship. It is a very satisfying book for the kind of readers who have been described by Mr. Boris Ford in his general introduction to the Pelican *Guide* as "something less than advanced and specialist students of literature."

S. SIRAJUDDIN

THE DARK DANCER, by Balachandra Rajan (Heinmann).

The Dark Dancer is the story of V. S. Krishnan, a Cambridge-educated Indian, who returns to India just before the great upheaval of Independence. To his father he is a bright prospect for the civil service, to his mother, a valuable source of money-making in the marriage market, and to his uncle "Kruger," a God-fearing, morally conscious Brahmin despite his Cambridge education and blasphemous notions of conduct. He has a marriage arranged and a career chalked out for him by his family, and, after a short-lived resistance, he submits to both. He would naturally have liked to marry a girl of his choice, if he had to marry at all. He would have preferred to become a teacher rather than a civil servant. But apparently "wiser" counsels prevail, and he marries the girl of his parents' choice and goes, where many bright young men end up, to the Central Secretariat in New Delhi, after a pointless involvement in a political demonstration. The process of Krishnan's domestication is interrupted by the arrival on the

scene of Cynthia Bainbridge, an English girl with whom he came into close contact at Cambridge. He is inexorably drawn towards her, and when Kamala is away visiting her parents, he begins to live with her. But this interregnum, like all other deviations of his from the path of "virtue," proves short-lived. The nightmarish life at Shantipur, the ordeal he has to go through there, the shocks to his refined sensibility, and, finally, the violent end of Kamala, rob him of the remnants of his idealism.

Krishnan is the central character in the novel. It is essentially the story of his transformation from a weak-willed idealist into a die-hard conservative. In this, probably, he is not unlike countless western-educated young Indians on whom the strangle-hold of society is too strong to allow them to live a life of their choice. After a struggle, which is as brief as it is futile, Krishnan submits to the convention-ridden way of life. His attempts at resisting the demands of convention—his refusal to marry according to his parents' wishes, his joining the teaching profession, his participation in politics, the Cynthia episode, and his escape from the files of the Secretariat to the scene of the riots at Shantipur,—all end in a surrender, total and abject. His is the all too familiar story of the idealist ending up as a near-reactionary. The "weight of resignation across his shoulders," he prepares to settle down to a life of realism and responsibility, the clothes he chooses in order to live with his defeats. He may not be happy about this business, but he does, in the end, "build a cage round himself and calls it belonging."

The other characters in the novel are much less skilfully drawn—the worldly-wise parents of Krishnan; his religious-minded uncle "Kruger," a queer mixture of spiritualism and selfishness, a type not uncommon in India; the cynical Vijayaraghavan; the undemonstrative Kamala, with her quiet courage; the unconvincing Cynthia; and the Medical Officer at Shantipur, who has been allowed by the novelist, for no apparent reason, to remain anonymous, although he plays quite an important part in the second half of the novel.

The outstanding quality of *The Dark Dancer* is irony. From the rather obvious irony of naming the town which is the scene of a blood-bath, Shantipur, to the infinitely more subtle touches found in the descriptions of Krishnan's wedding, of the slow moving life at the Secretariat in New Delhi, and even of the last rites performed for Kamala at Banaras,

irony pervades the story and, indeed, sustains it from beginning to end. And in the background, there is always the figure of the Dark Dancer, the Creator and the Destroyer, whose smile contrasts strangely with the irony in his eyes.

This book can be looked at from another angle, as a novel dealing with the post-Independence riots, which have provided the material for a great body of fiction in the Indian languages. Mr. Rajan's approach is too detached, too intellectual, to allow him to make the fullest use of this material. It cannot be said that his book, in this respect, is as successful as some of the books written in the Indian languages, or Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan.*

In another way, Mr. Rajan's intellectual background comes in the way of his making a complete success of his first novel. It is written in a stiff, self-conscious style which, though providing passages of brilliant satire and, occasionally, of genuine humour, yet suffers from a tendency to verbosity and heaviness, and a lack of naturalness in dialogues.

The Dark Dancer is a valuable addition to the already considerable body of what has come to be known as ' Indo-Anglian ' fiction.

TAQI ALI MIRZA

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

V. K. Gokak, an old Osmanian, is now Director of the Central Institute of English, Hyderabad. He has had a distinguished educational career at Bombay and Oxford. His contributions to Kannada poetry, novel, drama and criticism have recently won him the *Sahitya Akademi Award* for Kannada literature in 1960. The Government of India has also conferred upon him the Republic Day Award of *Padmashri*. His publications include *The Poetic Approach to Language*; *The Song of Life*, etc.

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Shiv K. Kumar is Professor of English at Osmania University. He wrote a doctoral dissertation on *The Stream of Consciousness Novel* at Cambridge University. He has published papers in *Notes and Queries*, *Modern Philology*, *Modern Language Notes*, *Modern Language Quarterly*, *Modern Fiction Studies*, *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, *Canadian Modern Language Review*, *Modern Language Review*, *English Studies*, *Indian Journal of English Studies*, *University of Kansas City Review*, *Literary Criterion*, etc. His book on the Stream of Consciousness Novel will be published shortly in England.